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"Conscience Clauses" or "Unconscionable Clauses":
Personal Beliefs Versus Professional Responsibilities
Martha S. Swartz, M.S.S., J.D.*
In 2002, a University of Wisconsin student brought a prescription for
Loestrin to pharmacist Neil Noesen, who was working in a local community
pharmacy in Menomonie, Wisconsin. Noesen refused to fill the prescription,
citing his "conscientious objection to participation in refilling a contraceptive
order."' He failed to ask the student whether she had any medical conditions that
might make pregnancy dangerous. 2 He also refused to inform her of any other
local pharmacies that were capable of filling the prescription.3 When the student,
on her own, located another pharmacy, Noesen refused to transfer the
prescription, claiming that doing so would "induce another to do a morally wrong
or sinful act pursuant to the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church."4 As a
result, the student was unable to take her medication as prescribed and risked
pregnancy.5
Pharmacists in a number of other states-including California, Georgia,
Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio,
Texas, and Washington-have also refused to fill similar prescriptions. 6 Some
pharmacists will only dispense birth control pills to married women; others
* Principal, Law Office of Martha Swartz, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Adjunct Professor of
Law, Rutgers School of Law-Camden. I would like to thank Mandy Knox, Allison Suflas, and
Sarah Wang for their valuable research assistance and Rutgers School of Law-Camden for its
support.
1. Protection of Conscience Project, Police Used To Intimidate Objecting Pharmacist:
Statement of Neil Noesen, pharmD (cand.) (Nov. 20, 2003), http://www.consciencelaws.org/
Repression-Conscience/Conscience-Repression-33.htm.
2. Disciplinary Proceeding Against Neil T. Noesen, 01 P.H.M. 080, slip op. at 16 (Wis.
Pharm. Examining Bd. Feb. 28, 2005) (proposed final decision & order), aff'd, Noesen v. Wis.
Dep't of Reg. & Licensing Pharm. Examining Bd., No. 05CV212 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Feb. 3, 2006).
3. Id. at 5.
4. Id. at 5.
5. Id. at 20. Indeed, the student later became pregnant as the result of one missed dose of her
contraceptive medication. Id.
6. Rob Stein, Pharmacists' Rights at Front of New Debate; Because of Beliefs, Some Refuse
To Fill Birth Control Prescriptions, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2005, at A 1.
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refuse to provide the pills to anyone, mistakenly believing emergency
contraception to be an abortafacient; 7 still others, like Noesen, "hold
prescriptions hostage" so that women are unable to take the prescriptions to other
pharmacies.
8
While much recent publicity has been directed at pharmacists who have
refused to fill prescriptions, for many years other health care professionals have
been quietly refusing to provide patients with medical care they believe violates
their personal beliefs. In 2004, a physician and nurse midwife in rural
Pennsylvania, citing their religious beliefs, refused to recommend an abortion to
a thirty-two-year-old woman who was nearly twenty weeks pregnant and
suffering from an infection of her amniotic fluid-notwithstanding the fact that
an abortion was the preferred medical therapy to avoid the spread of the
infection.9 Prioritizing their personal moral objections to abortion over the
patient's health, these professionals ignored the standard that traditionally has
guided health care providers in performing their professional responsibilities. 10
7. Unlike abortion, which terminates a pregnancy, contraception prevents pregnancy by
inhibiting fertilization and ovulation.
8. Stein, supra note 6; see also ACLU REPROD. FREEDOM PROJECT, RELIGIOUS REFUSALS AND
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS (2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/ACF911 .pdf; Tresa
Baldas, Fighting Refusal To Treat, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 7, 2005, at 17; Monica Davey & Pam Belluck,
Pharmacies Balk on After-Sex Pill and Widen Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2005, at Al. Some
commentators argue in favor of expanding pharmacists' rights to refuse. See, e.g., Donald W.
Herbe, Note, The Right To Refuse: A Call for Adequate Protection of a Pharmacist's Right To
Refuse Facilitation ofAbortion and Emergency Contraception, 17 J.L. & HEALTH 77 (2002-2003);
Melanie Hunter, Pro-Life Group Files Suit Against Walgreens for Pharmacists' Firings,
CYBERCAST NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 27, 2006, http://www.cnsnews.com/MainSearch/Search.html
(search "Pro-Life Group Files Suit Against Walgreens"). Other commentators argue against
pharmacists' abilities "to impose personal beliefs on others." Mary K. Collins, Conscience Clauses
and Oral Contraceptives: Conscientious Objection or Calculated Obstruction?, 15 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 37 (2006).
9. Thomas v. Abdul-Malak, No. 02-1374 (W.D. Pa. July 29, 2004) (on file with author).
10. Many other cases have been reported in which health care providers concluded that
providing a certain type of care would violate their personal moral codes. See, e.g., Brietta R.
Clark, When Free Exercise Exemptions Undermine Religious Liberty and the Liberty of
Conscience: A Case Study of the Catholic Hospital Conflict, 82 OR. L. REv. 625, 626-27 (2003)
(describing a case in which a physician personally paid for a car to transport his patient to another
hospital when her own hospital refused to provide a necessary abortion because the woman's life
was not imminently in danger). Other examples include cancer patients who sought information
about harvesting an egg or sperm, but faced providers unwilling to talk about the procedure,
pregnant patients being denied sterilization at religious hospitals, and providers denying pain
medications in end-of life situations. See, e.g., Baldas, supra note 8; Florence A. Ruderman,
Prescription for Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2005, at A23 (describing a pharmacist's refusal to
VI:2 (2006)
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Consequently, the woman suffered septic shock, was transferred to the hospital's
intensive care unit, and required a total hysterectomy."
The potential adverse effects on patient care caused by health professionals'
refusals to provide health services, as evidenced by the unwanted pregnancy of
the University of Wisconsin student who was unable to obtain her prescription
for birth control pills, did not deter the Wisconsin legislature from proposing
Assembly and Senate bills to explicitly permit pharmacists to refuse to distribute
medication that they believe will cause an abortion-even if that belief is not
medically supportable.' 2 Nor did concern for the ability of patients to obtain
necessary medical care prevent the Wisconsin legislature from passing a new law
that would give health care professionals, including pharmacists specifically,
broader ability to refuse to participate in a wide variety of medical procedures.
1 3
Previously enacted Wisconsin statutes allow health care professionals to opt
out of performing abortions and sterilizations. Assembly Bill 207, introduced in
March 2005, would have extended those refusal rights not only to participating in
procedures that involve embryonic stem cells, but also to withholding or
withdrawing nutrition or hydration from individuals who are not terminally ill,
such as patients in permanently vegetative states. 14 Governor Jim Doyle vetoed
the proposed law, refusing to permit such an expansion of health care
professionals' rights of refusal. In justifying his veto, he announced that the law
would "put[] a doctor's political views ahead of the best interests of patients,"
and therefore "ought to be called the 'unconscionable clause.'
' ' 5
Governor Doyle's veto, however, runs against the tide of protective
legislation enacted over the past thirty-five years that permits health care
professionals and institutions to refuse to participate in certain medical
procedures. For example, some state laws do not expressly require physicians to
fill pain medication for a terminally ill patient).
11. Abdul-Malek, No. 02-1374.
12. A.B. 285, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005); S.B. 155, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005).
These bills-neither of which were scheduled for a vote-would also permit pharmacists to refuse
to dispense a drug if "the pharmacist believes that the drug ... would be used for the purpose of...
[c]ausing the death of any person," but only "if the pharmacist consults with the practitioner who
prescribed the drug ... before the pharmacist makes the refusal"; no such condition is attached to
the refusal to dispense medication that the pharmacist believes "would be used for the purpose
of... [c]ausing an abortion." Wis. A.B. 285; Wis. S.B. 155; see also H.B. 1383, 104th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005); S.B. 76, 104th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005)
(permitting pharmacists to refuse to dispense any medicines that violate their moral principles).
13. A.B. 207, 97th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wis. 2005) (vetoed).
14. Id. at § 3(b)(7).
15. Jim Doyle, Veto Statement (October 14, 2005), http://www.wisgov.state.wi.us/docview.
asp?docid=5111. The governor vetoed a similar bill in 2004.
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participate in abortions, even when abortion is necessary to save the woman's life
and even if no other physician is available. 16 Several states permit pharmacists to
refuse to fill prescriptions for contraceptives if doing so would conflict with the
pharmacist's personal or moral beliefs.17 Some states permit nurses to refuse to
participate in terminating the life support of a terminally ill patient, regardless of
the patient's and patient's family's wishes, if the nurse believes that participating
in such procedures would violate her religious beliefs.1 8 In fact, in some states,
any kind of health care provider may refuse to provide any kind of health service
based on her personal beliefs. 19
Emergency contraception has been a particularly controversial subject for
state legislatures and governors. 20 The controversy surrounds whether the pill
16. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-1 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 435.485 (West
2003).
17. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(5) (West 2005) ("religious or conscientious
objection"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0051(6) (West 2005) ("religious reasons"); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 1903(4) (2005) ("religious or conscientious objection"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-
104(5) (2005) ("religious or conscientious objection"); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-2B-4 (West 2006)
("personal religious beliefs"); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-101(d) (2005) ("personal or religious
beliefs"); cf GA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-6 (2005) (permitting refusal due to "personal religious beliefs,"
but authorizing agency directors "to reassign the duties of any such employees in order to carry out
this chapter effectively"); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 435.225 (West 2003) (permitting refusal if a
procedure is contrary to employee's "personal or religious beliefs," but requiring that employee to
"notify the immediate supervisor in writing of such refusal in order that arrangements may be made
for eligible persons to obtain such information and services from another employee").
18. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.060(e) (2005); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5409(b) (West
2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-30-12(b) (West 2006).
19. See, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/3 (West 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(1)
(2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5(1) (2005). But see Doyle, supra note 15.
20. State legislatures in Alaska, California, Hawaii, Maine, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and
Washington have all passed bills requiring hospital emergency rooms to make emergency
contraception available to rape survivors and to allow pharmacists to dispense emergency
contraception through a collaborative agreement with a physician. NARAL Pro-Choice
Massachusetts, Emergency Contraception Bill (Sept. 15, 2005), http://www.prochoicemass.org/
sl0issues/200309292.shtml. In Massachusetts, the state legislature overrode Governor Mitt
Romney's veto of a bill requiring all hospitals to dispense emergency contraception to rape victims.
Although the state public health commissioner originally interpreted the law not to apply to private
hospitals, Massachusetts To Exempt Private Hospitals from Emergency Contraception Laws, NEWS
TARGET, Dec. 18, 2005, http://www.newstarget.com/z015976.html, Governor Romney's
administration eventually overturned that interpretation. On February 15, 2006, the New York
Times reported that the Massachusetts state pharmacy board ruled that Wal-Mart pharmacies were
required under state law to stock and dispense emergency contraception. Katie Zezima,
Massachusetts: Contraceptives Must Be Stocked, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 15, 2006, at A20; see also
VI:2 (2006)
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should be available in hospital emergency rooms for administration to rape
victims. As a practical matter, emergency contraception, or the "morning-after
pill," must be dispensed to women within seventy-two hours of unprotected
sexual intercourse in order to prevent a pregnancy.2 Some state legislatures have
passed laws that specifically permit hospitals or pharmacists that hold religious
22or moral objections to refuse to dispense the medication, while others have
enacted laws requiring all hospitals, including religious hospitals, to dispense the
drug.23 The relationships between state legislatures and state governors are being
severely tested as governors veto these bills, some on the basis that the State
should not interfere with the physician-patient relationship 24 and others on the
basis that the State should not interfere with the rights of religious hospitals.
25
Some may challenge the appropriateness of state-licensed hospitals refusing
to provide emergency contraception to rape victims. Others may question the
professionalism of the pharmacist who refused to dispense birth control pills and
the physician and nurse who refused to provide the medical treatment necessary
to preserve their patient's reproductive capacity. Nevertheless, since the early
1970s, the U.S. Congress and most state legislatures have widely accepted the
ability of health care professionals and institutions to refuse to perform their
Doyle, supra note 15; Janet Napolitano, Veto Statement (Apr. 13, 2005),
http://www.governor.state.az.us/press/2 0 0 5/0504/veto%2 0 etter%2 0 HB%2025 4 1.pdf (vetoing H.B.
2541, which would have permitted "pharmacies and health care institutions to refuse to sell
lawfully prescribed health care products and services"); Bill Owens, Veto Statement (Apr. 5, 2005),
http://www.colorado.gov/govemor/press/april05/l042.html (vetoing H.B. 05-1042, which would
have required "all hospitals to provide [rape] victims information about the availability of
emergency contraception").
21. E-Medicine Consumer Health, Emergency Contraception, http://www.emedicinehealth.
com/emergency-contraception/article-em.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
22. See, e.g., H.B. 2541, 47th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2005) (permitting pharmacists to
refuse to provide emergency contraception if doing so conflicts with their moral or religious
beliefs). The bill was vetoed by Governor Napolitano on April 5, 2005. Napolitano, supra note 20;
cf A.B. 21, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) (requiring pharmacies to find ways to fill
prescriptions when an individual pharmacist refuses to provide medication on moral or religious
grounds).
23. See, e.g., H.B. 05-1042, 65th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2005) (requiring hospitals to tell
rape victims about the availability of emergency contraception). Governor Bill Owens vetoed the
bill. Owens, supra note 20. At the federal level, Senator Lautenberg (D-NJ), Representatives
Carolyn Malone (D-NY), and Debbie Wasserman-Schultz (D-FL) recently introduced the Access to
Legal Pharmaceuticals Act, H.R. 1652, 109th Cong. (2005), that would allow individual
pharmacists to refuse to fill a prescription, but only if another pharmacist at the same pharmacy
would fill it.
24. See, e.g., Napolitano, supra note 20.
25. See, e.g., Owens, supra note 20.
5
Swartz: "Conscience Clauses" or "Unconscionable Clauses"
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
professional responsibilities because of their personal moral or religious beliefs.
On the federal level, Congress passed the Hyde-Weldon Amendment in 2004,
which requires federal funds to be disbursed only to federal agencies that honor
so-called conscience clauses; as a condition of federal funding, agencies must
allow the institutions, insurers, health care facilities, and individual health care
providers that they fund to refuse to provide, pay for, provide coverage for, or
refer for abortions.26 Unlike the majority of conscience clauses that have
proliferated in the past thirty years, the Hyde-Weldon Amendment is so broadly
drafted that it does not limit a health care provider's objection to personal belief
or conscience. Rather, any reason for refusal will suffice. The Amendment even
permits health care providers to refuse to provide, pay for, or even refer patients
for abortions when the abortion is necessary to save the life of the mother.a7
As overreaching as the Hyde-Weldon Amendment is, it is merely the latest
in a series of federal and state laws that allow health care providers, institutions,
28and insurers to refuse to provide medical care to patients. Various professional
associations also have incorporated provisions into their official Codes of Ethics
that allow their members to decline to perform particular procedures or provide
certain services on the basis of their personal beliefs.29 Until 2005, the Joint
26. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, Division F, Title V, §
508(d), 118 Stat. 2809 (2004). The Hyde-Weldon Amendment is modeled after the Abortion Non-
Discrimination Act of 2003. H.R. 3664, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 1397, 108th Cong. (2003). The
House of Representatives passed a version of this bill in 2002. H.R. 4691, 107th Cong. (2002). The
Senate, however, did not consider the measure at that time. Rather, the substance of the bill was
incorporated into the Hyde-Weldon Amendment to the Fiscal Year 2005 Appropriations Act. Thus,
the measure must be attached to subsequent appropriations acts in order to remain in effect. Nat'l
Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass'n, Federal "Refusal Clause" Signed into Law by President
Bush as Part of Omnibus Spending Bill (Dec. 8, 2004), http://www.nfprha.org/pac/factsheets/
anda.asp.
27. The law is the subject of lawsuits both by the State of California and the National Family
Planning and Reproductive Health Association. The State of California contends that the Hyde-
Weldon Amendment prevents California from enforcing its own laws regarding medically
necessary abortions. Steven Ertelt, Lawsuit Against Abortion Conscience Clause Can Continue,
Judge Rules, LIFENEWS.COM, June 29, 2005, http://www.lifenews.com/netl408.html. The National
Family Planning and Reproductive Health Association has filed suit on the basis that the Hyde-
Weldon Amendment contradicts Title X's requirement that information regarding abortion be
provided to patients. Nat'l Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass'n, Press Release: NFPRHA
Argues that New Federal Refusal Clause Threatens Women's Reproductive Health, Urges Judge
To Enjoin Law (Jan. 5, 2005), http://www.nfprha.org/media/index.asp?ID=33.
28. See Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers, 14 J.
LEGAL MED. 177, 178 (1993) ("Forty-four states and the United States presently [as of 1993] have
some kind of statutory conscience clause.").
29. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS'N, H-295.896, CONSCIENCE CLAUSE: FINAL REPORT, available at
VI:2 (2006)
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Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations required hospitals
to adopt policies allowing staff members to refuse to participate in certain types
of health care.30 Some hospitals have entered into agreements with their staffs
acknowledging staff members' rights to refuse to participate in certain types of
http://www.ama-assn.org (search "H-295.896"; then follow "Policy Finder - American Medical
Association: H-295.896") (last visited March 10, 2006) (requiring medical schools to have
*'mechanisms in place that permit students to be excused from activities that violate the students'
religious or ethical beliefs"); Lois Snyder & Cathy Leffler (for the Ethics and Human Rights
Comm., Am. College of Physicians), Ethics Manual, Ffth Edition, 142 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED.
560, 564, 571 (2005) (stating that physicians who object to abortion, sterilization, contraception, or
other reproductive services are "not obligated to recommend, perform, or prescribe them," although
they are obligated to "transfer care as along as the health of the patient is not compromised," but at
the same time recognizing that "[t]he physician's first and primary duty is to the patient" and "[t]he
physician's professional role is to make recommendations on the basis of their medical merit and to
pursue options that comport with the patient's unique background and preferences"); cf AM.
NURSES Ass'N, CODE OF ETHICS FOR NURSES WITH INTERPRETIVE STATEMENTS Provision 5.4 (2001),
available at http://www.nursingworld.org/ethics/code/protected-nwcoe303.htm ("Where a
particular treatment, intervention, activity, or practice is morally objectionable to the nurse, whether
intrinsically so or because it is inappropriate for the specific patient, or where it may jeopardize
both patients and nursing practice, the nurse is justified in refusing to participate on moral grounds.
Such grounds exclude personal preference, prejudice, convenience, or arbitrariness. Conscientious
objection may not insulate the nurse against formal or informal penalty."). Additionally, the
American Pharmacists Association has addressed the refusal rights of its members. The Code of
Ethics for Pharmacists affirms that "[a] pharmacist places concern for the well-being of the patient
at the center of professional practice." AM. PHAR.M. ASS'N, CODE OF ETHICS FOR PHARMACISTS
(1994), http://www.apha.org (follow "Pharmacy Practice" hyperlink; then follow "Code of Ethics"
hyperlink under "Pharmacy Practice Resources"). However, in reaction to the legalization of
physician assisted suicide in Oregon, the American Pharmacists Association adopted an additional
policy stating: "APhA recognizes the individual pharmacist's right to exercise conscientious refusal
and supports the establishment of systems to ensure [the] patient's access to legally prescribed
therapy without compromising the pharmacist's right of conscientious refusal." Freedom of
Conscience for Small Pharmacies: Hearing Before the H. Small Business Comm., 109th Cong.
(2005) (statement of Linda Garrelts MacLean, Clinical Assistant Professor of Pharmacotherapy,
Washington State University on behalf of the American Pharmacists Association), available at
http://wwwc.house.gov/smbiz/hearings/databaseDrivenHearingsSystem/displayTestimony.asp?hear
ingldDateFormat-050725&testimonyld=380.
30. JOINT COMM'N FOR THE ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., COMPREHENSIVE
ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE OFFICIAL HANDBOOK, at CK-30 (2005) (modifying
this standard from one in which the refusal rights of health care workers are emphasized to one
which focuses on the needs of patients, suggesting a possible change in focus). This standard
previously stated: "The hospital addresses a staff member's request not to participate in any aspect
of patient care." Id. In 2005, this standard was modified to read: "The hospital follows ethical
behavior in its care, treatment, and services and business practices." Id. at RI-8.
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treatment. Perhaps most notably, St. Vincent's Hospital in Santa Fe, New
Mexico, entered into an agreement which allows nurses to "conscientiously
object to circumcision. 31
In addition to circumcisions, nurses and physicians have refused to
participate in sterilizations,32 abortions,33 withdrawal of life support,34 and
artificial insemination 35 on grounds that these procedures conflict with their
religious or moral beliefs. The types of prescriptions that pharmacists have
refused to provide include not only contraception and emergency contraception,
but even pain-killers for terminally ill patients.36
Against the recent tide of legislation and commentary promoting the
expansion of so-called conscience clauses, 37 a few scholars have argued in favor
of restricting the ability of health care providers who serve the public from
refusing to provide certain types of care.38 However, even those commentators
31. St. Vincent Hospital, Memorandum of Understanding for Circumcision Procedure (Jan. 31,
1995), http://www.consciencelaws.org/Conscience-Policies-Papers/PPPMedicallnst.html#MEMO
RANDUM%200F%20UNDERSTANDNG%20for/o2OCIRCUMCISION%20PROCEDURE.
32. E.g., Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973) (involving a
Catholic hospital that refused to allow a patient to undergo a sterilization procedure at the time she
was having a Caesarian section), aff'd, 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975).
33. E.g., Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Mat-su Coal. for Choice, 948 P. 2d 963 (Alaska 1997)
(involving a hospital that refused to allow elective abortions to be performed at its facility).
34. E.g., Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984)
(involving a hospital that refused to disconnect a mechanical respirator at the patient's request); In
re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987) (involving a nursing home that refused to remove a feeding
tube from a patient in a vegetative state at the request of her husband); see discussion infra Part III.
35. E.g., N. Coast Women's Care Med. Group, Inc. v. Superior Court, No. D045438, 2006 WL
618767 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2006).
36. Baldas, supra note 8, at 17.
37. See, e.g., Bryan A. Dykes, Proposed Rights of Conscience Legislation: Expanding To
Include Pharmacists and Other Health Care Providers, 36 GA. L. REv. 565 (2002); Donald W.
Herbe, supra note 8; Maureen Kramlich, Coercing Conscience: The Effort To Mandate Abortion as
a Standard of Care, 4 NAT'L CATHOLIC BIOETHICS Q. 29 (2004); Mark S. Latkovic, Pro-Life Nurses
and Cooperation in Abortion: Ordinary Care or Extraordinary Intervention?, 4 NAT'L CATHOLIC
BIOETHICS Q. 89 (2004); Irene Prior Loftus, I Have a Conscience, Too: The Plight of Medical
Personnel Confronting the Right To Die, 65 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 699 (1990); Staci D. Lowell,
Striking a Balance: Finding a Place for Religious Conscience Clauses in Contraceptive Equity
Legislation, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 441 (2005); Nikolas T. Nikas, Law and Public Policy To Protect
Health-Care Rights of Conscience, 4 NAT'L CATHOLIC BIOETHICS Q. 41 (2004); Wardle, supra note
28; Carol Hogan, Conscience Clauses and the Challenge of Cooperation in a Pluralistic Society,
CAL. CATHOLIC CONF., Feb. 2003, available at http://www.cacatholic.org/rfconscience.html. See
generally Protection of Conscience Project, www.consciencelaws.org (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
38. See, e.g., William W. Bassett, Private Religious Hospitals: Limitations upon Autonomous
VI:2 (2006)
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who argue against the expansion of refusal clauses generally do not question the
right of individual health care professionals to refuse to participate in care to
which they object on the basis of their personal consciences. 9 Rather, those
commentators endorse the autonomous right of individual health care
professionals to refuse to provide care based on their religious or moral beliefs.
At least one commentator has suggested that the physician's right to assert her
personal autonomy in the form of her personal conscience-quite aside from
professional ethics-is at least as important as the patient's autonomous right to
choose her medical treatment.
40
This Article argues that, while health care professionals should be
encouraged to refuse to participate in treatment that violates the generally
accepted professional standards of practice applicable to their professions, the
monopolistic state-granted licenses that medical professionals receive should
preclude these professionals from injecting their personal beliefs into their
professional practices. Such a distinction must be made between professional
integrity based on prevailing medical ethics and personal morality in order not
only to protect patient access to medical care, but also to implement health care
professionals' fiduciary obligations to their patients. The provision of medically
indicated health care should be the health care professional's primary
responsibility, subordinating personal religious or moral beliefs to the needs of
patients.4' Recognizing this principle will reinforce patient trust in health care
Moral Choices in Reproductive Medicine, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 455 (2001); Susan
Berke Fogel & Lourdes A. Rivera, Saving Roe Is Not Enough. When Religion Controls Healthcare,
31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 725 (2004) [hereinafter Fogel & Rivera, Saving Roe is Not Enough]; Sylvia
A. Law, Silent No More: Physicians' Legal and Ethical Obligations to Patients Seeking Abortions,
21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 279 (1994-1995); Louis-Jacques Van Bogaert, The Limits of
Conscientious Objection to Abortion in the Developing World, 2 DEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICS
131 (2002); Susan Berke Fogel & Lourdes A. Rivera, Religious Beliefs and Healthcare Necessities:
Can They Coexist?, HUM. RTS. MAG., Summer 2003, at 2, available at
http:/www.abanet.org/irr/hr/spring03/religiousbeliefs.html.
39. See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 38, at 456 (arguing that while the refusal rights of individual
health care professionals should be secured, health care institutions should be able to refuse only if
patients can choose their providers freely).
40. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights and
Obligations in the Physician-Patient Relationship, l0 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 47, 58
(1994) ("The physician-patient relationship is a moral equation with reciprocal rights and
obligations. Today, that equation is becoming unbalanced as patient autonomy is elevated to the
status of a trumping principle, morally as well as legally. For some, this even implies or includes
overriding the physician's values, his discretionary latitude in clinical decisions, and in some cases,
even his rights of conscience.").
41. In arguing against the acceptance of physician-assisted suicide, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that "[t]he patient's trust in the doctor's whole-hearted devotion to his best interests
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professionals and the integrity of the health care system.
The expected standard of care for health professionals should be to place
patients' interests above their own. The patient's autonomous expression of her
interests should set the course for medical decision-making, guided by the health
care professional's advice. The professional's advice should derive from both
clinical evidence and professional ethics. The personal religious or moral beliefs
of the health care professional should not play a role in this process.
The wave of legislatively enacted refusal clauses condoning the practice of
refusing to participate in the delivery of health care should be abated.
Professional schools should teach, institutional policies should encourage, and
professional codes of ethics should confirm that health care professionals are
professionally obligated to provide patients with requested care-so long as it is
not medically contra-indicated, prohibited from the standpoint of professional
ethics, or illegal. Disfavoring medical professionals from injecting their personal
moral judgments into their clinical decision-making will reinforce the health care
professional's fiduciary duty to her patients and bolster the trust placed in her by
her patients who should be able to assume that the professional's primary interest
is in promoting their health.
This approach does not mean that there is no room for medical professionals
to raise issues of personal conscience in refusing to provide medically indicated
care, but it does mean that circumstances in which conscientious objection based
on personal beliefs is considered acceptable should be rare. To ensure the rarity
of their invocation, health care professionals should be admonished that
conscientious objections based on personal beliefs, as opposed to professional
ethics, will entail consequences. Most severely, where conscientious objection
adversely impacts a patient's health, the professional might be subject to
reprimand, transfer, or termination.42 The Nurses Code of Ethics recognizes this
possibility when it states: "[c]onscientious objection may not insulate the nurse
against formal or informal penalty. 43 When a professional represents herself as a
will be hard to sustain [if physician-assisted suicide is permitted]." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 731 (1997) (Assisted Suicide in the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 355-56 (1996) (statement of Dr. Leon
R. Kass)). A similar argument can be put forth against the physician who, in refusing to provide
treatment based upon her personal moral code, places her own personal interests ahead of those of
the patient, thus violating the patient's trust in the physician's devotion to her best interests.
42. See, e.g., Wis. ADMIN. CODE § Phar 10.03(2) (West 2006) (defining "unprofessional
conduct" as "[e]ngaging in any pharmacy practice which constitutes a danger to the health, welfare,
or safety of patient or public, including but not limited to, practicing in a manner which
substantially departs from the standard of care ordinarily exercised by a pharmacist which harmed
or could have harmed a patient...") (emphasis added).
43. AM. NURSES ASS'N, supra note 29, at Provision 5.4.
VI:2 (2006)
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provider of certain services, she has a responsibility to provide that care without
reference to her personal beliefs. This is especially true for medical professionals
who, by virtue of their state-granted licenses, hold a monopoly on the type of
care they provide.
This Article reviews the history of "conscience" or "refusal" clauses in
federal and state laws, as well as their treatment by various courts. Part I
highlights the expansion of refusal clauses and the distinctions various clauses
make in their coverage. Part II reviews the case law involving both institutions
and individuals who have refused to provide care. While both federal and state
legislatures are increasingly sympathetic to the passage of broad refusal clauses,
courts have been somewhat less lenient in their interpretation of these and related
laws. Part III discusses the concurrent and at times opposing movement toward
enhanced patient autonomy. In the context of medical decision-making, courts
have generally not condoned health care professionals' prerogatives to advance
their values over their patient's desires. Part IV elaborates on some of the
compromises that have been proposed to address potential conflicts between
patients' exercise of their decision-making autonomy and their access to health
care, on the one hand, and the health care provider's personal beliefs, on the
other. Part V finds none of these so-called compromises satisfactory. It suggests
that the proliferation of these clauses undermines patient autonomy, threatens
patient access to care, and subverts patients' trust in their health care
professionals. Rather than being guided by their personal moral judgments,
health care professionals should be guided by those ethics that comprise the
standard of care of their professions. Part VI argues against the wholesale
acceptance of conscience or refusal clauses, positing that the medical needs of
the patient should eclipse the personal morality of the treating health care
professional. The opportunity for conscientious objection on the basis of the
health care professional's personal morals should be discouraged. Due to the
monopolistic nature of health care professionals' state-granted licenses, these
professionals should be obligated to provide requested medical care that is not
medically contraindicated, is not outside generally accepted medical or
professional ethics, and is not illegal.
I. EXPANSION OF REFUSAL CLAUSES
Refusal clauses first began to proliferate at the state and federal levels
following the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade." Initially, such clauses
granted the rights of health care providers to refuse to participate in abortion and
sterilization. However, over the past thirty-five years, refusal clauses have
44. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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expanded to cover a broader range of entities and types of procedures. While
early refusal clauses applied only to direct providers of care and health care
45institutions, more recent clauses often extend to indirect providers of care,
including payers.46 Recent refusal clauses extend far beyond abortion and
sterilization to include, in some cases, all types of health services. 47
The Church Amendment, enacted in 1973, was the first federally mandated
conscience clause.48 The Amendment prohibited a court or public official from
using certain federal funds49 to require any individual or institution to perform or
assist in performing abortions or sterilization procedures, if doing so would
violate the individual's or institution's religious or moral beliefs.5° It also
prohibited certain federally funded institutions from discriminating in admission
for internships and residencies against any health care professional on the basis
of her refusal to participate in an abortion or sterilization procedure contrary to
her religious or moral beliefs.5' Finally, it extended protection of the health care
professional's right to refuse beyond abortion and sterilization to all health
services funded through the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS),
specifying that no individuals participating in programs and research activities
funded through DHHS "shall be required to perform or assist in the performance
of any part of a health service program. .. if his performance or assistance in the
performance of such part of such programs.., would be contrary to his religious
beliefs or moral convictions.,
52
45. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 435.485 (West 2005) (effective 1969) ("No physician is
required to give advice with respect to or participate in any termination of a pregnancy if the refusal
to do so is based on an election not to give such advice or to participate in such terminations and
the physician so advises the patient.").
46. E.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-107-9 (West 2004) ("A health care payer has the right to
decline to pay, and no health care payer shall be required to pay for or arrange for the payment of a
health care service that violates its conscience."); see also ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 20-16-304(4)-(5)
(West 2005) (extending the right of refusal explicitly to pharmacists who object to providing
contraceptives).
47. See, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/1 (West 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3 (West
2004). The state of Washington was ahead of this trend; it enacted a similarly broad statute in 1995.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.47.160 (West 2006) (effective 1995).
48. Health Programs Extension Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-45, § 401(b), 87 Stat. 91 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2000)).
49. Id. ("[T]he Public Health Service Act [42 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.], the Community Mental
Health Centers Act [42 U.S.C. § 2689 et seq.], or the Developmental Disabilities Services and
Facilities Construction Act [42 U.S.C. § 6000 et seq.] ... .
50. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(e).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d).
VI:2 (2006)
12
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 6 [2006], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol6/iss2/2
CONSCIENCE CLAUSES OR UNCONSCIONABLE CLAUSES
Enacted in response both to Roe, which effectively required all states to
permit non-therapeutic abortions, and to Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hospital,53 in
which a Catholic hospital was compelled to perform a tubal ligation in violation
of Catholic directives, the Church Amendment set the course for subsequent
legislation at both the state and federal levels. Although some states had refusal
statutes in place that addressed "therapeutic abortions" ' 54 before Roe was
decided,55 there was a flurry of legislative activity after Roe, with state
legislatures creating rights of refusal for both health care professionals and
institutions to permit them not to participate in now-legalized abortions.56 Some
statutes were limited to abortion,57 but others included rights of refusal for both
abortion and sterilization procedures.58 While most permitted both health care
institutions and individuals to refuse to participate in abortions, some gave
53. 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973), aff'd, 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975). The plaintiffs sued
the hospital under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343, claiming that the hospital, due to its
receipt of Hill Burton funds (i.e., funds provided for hospital construction under Title VI of the
Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 291 (2000)), had acted under the color of state law when it
deprived them of their right to have tubal ligation surgery at the hospital. The district court initially
ruled that the hospital's receipt of federal funds was sufficient to make the hospital a state actor for
the purpose of the suit. However, the district court dissolved the injunction following Congress's
adoption of the Church Amendment, which "[b]y its plain language ... prohibits any court from
finding that a hospital which receives Hill-Burton funds is acting under color of state law." Taylor,
369 F. Supp. at 950.
54. "Therapeutic abortions" were abortions that were considered medically necessary to
preserve the health or life of the pregnant woman. Hospitals often established boards to determine
whether an abortion was "therapeutic."
55. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 435.485 (West 2003) (enacted 1969) ("(1) No physician is
required to give advice with respect to or participate in any termination of a pregnancy if the refusal
to do so is based on an election not to give such advice or to participate in such terminations and
the physician advises the patient .... (2) No hospital employee or member of the hospital medical
staff is required to participate in any termination of a pregnancy if the employee or staff member
notifies the hospital of the election not to participate in such terminations."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-
5-2 (West 2005) (enacted 1969) (stating that hospitals are not required to admit patients "for the
purposes of performing an abortion," nor is a "person who is a member of, or associated with, the
staff of a hospital, or any employee of a hospital . .. who objects to the justified medical
termination on moral or religious grounds" required to participate in the procedure).
56. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151 (West 2005) (enacted 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:65A-I (West 2005) (enacted 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-2 (West 2005) (enacted 1974);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632.475 (West 2005) (enacted 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306(2)
(West 2005) (enacted 1974).
57. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.20182 (West 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632.475
(West 2005).
58. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-I (West 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (2005).
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special protection to "private or denominational" institutions. 59
In 1981, Congress again addressed the issue of the right to refuse to
participate in certain types of medical care, expanding that right to cover health
insurers. As part of its appropriations bill for the District of Columbia, Congress
specified that any legislation regarding contraceptive coverage by health
insurance plans must contain a "conscience clause" that "provides exceptions for
religious beliefs and moral convictions."
60
As the number of state refusal clauses in the area of reproductive services
continued to increase after 1973, the right of health care providers to refuse to
participate in other types of services began to appear after 1976. In that year, the
New Jersey Supreme Court decided the case of In Re Quinlan, in which the
parents of Karen Quinlan, a young woman in a persistent vegetative state,
petitioned the court to authorize the removal of the respirator upon which she
appeared to depend to breathe.6' In response to public pressure triggered by this
well-publicized case, state legislatures began passing "Natural Death Acts,"
which permitted people to prepare living wills through which they could provide
medical direction to their care providers in the event that they were not able to
express their wishes at the relevant time. Since 1976, all states have enacted
some form of advance directive legislation, whether in the form of living wills,
durable powers of attorney, or health care proxies; 62 virtually all of these statutes
contain clauses that permit health care professionals to disregard a patient's or
59. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-1-3 (West 2005); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306(2) (West
2005).
60. Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Division C, Title III, Pub. L. No. 108-7,
117 Stat. 11, 126-27 (2003).
61. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). In fact, Karen lived for ten years after the
respirator was removed. Ascension Health: Healthcare Ethics, Quinlan, Karen Ann (2005),
http://www.ascensionhealth.org/ethics/public/cases/case2 1.asp. Ten "living will" statutes were
enacted between 1976 through 1980 and twenty-nine were enacted between 1981 and 1986.
SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT To DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS 5 (1987). Other states waited to
enact "living will" legislation until the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Nancy Cruzan, in
which the parents of a young woman in a persistent vegetative state petitioned the court to
authorize the removal of the woman's artificial nutrition and hydration. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). In her concurring opinion in Cruzan, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
specifically encouraged the use of various types of advance directives as "a valuable additional
safeguard of the patient's interest in directing his medical care." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 291-92
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
62. See Advance Directives by State, WALL ST. J., March 22, 2005, available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB 111 144394604885495-4MQpLbfZZSZWMXQ4BdPaLO_ d
Ok_20050421 .html?mod=tffmain tff top.
VI:2 (2006)
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family's wishes due to the health care professionals' personal beliefs.63
As the 1990s progressed, Congress began to focus again on ways to
accommodate health care providers who refused to perform various reproductive
services. In 1991, Congress adopted the Coats Amendment, which prohibits the
government from "discriminating" against medical residency programs or other
entities that lose accreditation because they fail to provide or require training in
abortion services. 64 In 1997, Congress extended "conscience protections" to
cover Medicaid and Medicare managed care plans, enabling them to refuse to
"provide, reimburse for, or provide coverage of a counseling or referral service if
the ... organization offering the plan ... objects to the provision of such service
on moral or religious grounds .... Two years later, after a long battle,
Congress agreed to require health plans that insure federal employees to cover
prescription contraception; however, Congress explicitly exempted religiously
affiliated health plans from this requirement.6 6 Other conscience clauses
proscribe "discrimination" against individuals in specified government-funded
health plans that refuse to provide contraceptives due to their "religious beliefs or
moral convictions, '67 or against organizations funded under various international
health funding programs that limit the types of treatment they provide based on
63. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.060(e) (2004) (providing that "[a] health care provider
may decline to comply with an individual instruction or a health care decision for reasons of
conscience"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:6(l) (2005) (providing that a physician is not required
to comply with an advance directive if, "because of his personal beliefs or conscience, [he] is
unable to comply"); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-12(b) (2005) (providing that no individual health care
provider is required to comply with a patient's health care decision if it is "contrary to the
individual provider's sincerely held religious beliefs or sincerely held moral convictions"). Very
few states do not require unwilling providers to make transfer arrangements. Among that small
number are Michigan, which has no Natural Death Act; Minnesota, which establishes explicitly
that an unwilling provider need not transfer the patient unless the patient becomes mentally
incapacitated and unable to seek transfer, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.06 (West 2005); North
Carolina, which interprets N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321 (2005) not to require an unwilling institution
to transfer a patient, Advisory Opinion: Institutional Objections to Advance Directives, 1996 WL
925107 (May 23, 1996); and Washington, which is silent on the issue of transfer, WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 43.70.480, 70.122.060 (West 2006).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 238(n) (2000) (effective 1996); see also Abortion Non-Discrimination Act of
2005, S. 1983, 109th Cong. (2005) (extending the non-discrimination provision of the Coats
amendment beyond the training and licensing of physicians to insurers, other health professionals,
facilities, organizations, and plans).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(j)(3)(b) (2000).
66. Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Division E, Title II, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117
Stat. 11, 163 (2003).
67. Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003. Division J, Title VI, § 635(c), Pub. L. No.
108-7, 117 Stat. 11,472 (2003).
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their "religious or conscientious commitment" or "religious or moral
objection.,
68
Currently, virtually all states have legislated refusal clauses that excuse
health care professionals or institutions from providing medical care under
specified circumstances. 69 Among the types of treatments and services covered
are: abortion,7 contraception,71 insurance to cover contraception,72 family
planning services or referrals,73 sterilization,74 assisted reproduction,75 human
cloning,76 fetal experimentation,77 euthanasia,78 and termination of life support.79
68. United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-25, 117 Stat. 711, 733 (2003); Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Division
E, Title II.
69. See GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REFUSING To PROVIDE HEALTH
SERVICES (2006), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/spibRPHS.pdf (listing all federal
and state laws allowing nonparticipation in reproductive health care as of Mar. 1, 2006). Forty-six
states allow some health care providers to refuse to provide abortion services; all permit individual
health care providers to refuse to provide abortion services; forty-three states allow institutions to
refuse to provide abortion services (fifteen states limit the exemption to private or denominational
institutions, and one state allows only religious health care entities to refuse to provide abortion
services); thirteen states allow some health care providers to refuse to provide services related to
contraception (eight states allow individual health care providers to refuse to provide contraceptive-
related services; four states explicitly permit pharmacists to refuse to dispense contraceptives; four
additional states have broad refusal clauses that may apply to pharmacists); ten states allow health
care institutions to refuse to provide services related to contraception (six states limit the exemption
to private entities, and one state limits it to religious entities); seventeen states allow some health
care providers to refuse to provide sterilization services (sixteen states allow individual providers to
refuses to provide sterilization services, and fifteen states allow institutions to refuse to provide
sterilization services; four limit the exemption to private entities). Id.
70. See id.
71. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(5) (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0051(6) (West
2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-6 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1903(4) (2005); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 435.225 (West 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-104(5) (2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
16-2B-4 (West 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-101(d) (2005); see also GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE,
supra note 69.
72. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:1OA-1 16.7(a)(4)(b) (2004).
73. See NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA FOUNDATION, REFUSAL CLAUSES: DANGEROUS FOR
WOMEN'S HEALTH (2006), available at http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/assets/files/Abortion-
Access-to-Abortion-Refusal-Clauses-Refusal-Clauses-Dangerous.pdf.
74. See GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, supra note 69.
75. See, e.g., H.B. 5085, 2005 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2005).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:11-9 (West 2006) ("Nothing in this act.., shall give the
licensing authority or agency herein provided for the power or authority to require any hospital to
VI:2 (2006)
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Proponents of expanding the coverage of conscience clauses advocate the
application of these clauses to many other procedures, including autopsies, organ
transplants, blood transfusions, medical experimentation, and physician-assisted
suicide °80 Participation in human embryonic stem cell research has already been
included in the most recently proposed refusal clauses. 8' Within the past three
years, at least two states have enacted far-reaching refusal statutes that define
"health care" or "health care services" so broadly as to cover virtually all types of
treatment,8 2 and at least three additional state legislatures have proposed similarly
far-reaching statutes.
8 3
All refusal statutes, as currently enacted, apply to health care providers who
provide direct care to patients.84 Many also permit institutions to refuse to
practice or permit sterilization of human beings, euthanasia, birth control or any other similar
practice contrary to the dogmatic or moral beliefs of any well established religious body or
denomination ...."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2005) ( "No pharmacist may be required to
dispense medication if there is reason to believe that the medication would be used to ... [clause
the death of any person by means of an assisted suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing.").
79. See. e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:6(11) (2005); W.VA. CODE § 16-30-12 (2005).
80. Wardle, supra note 28, at 177, 181.
81. See. e.g., H.B. 5085. 2005 Gen. Assem, Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2005).
82. See, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/3 (West 2006) (defining "[h]ealth care" to include
"any phase of patient care, including but not limited to, testing; diagnosis; prognosis; ancillary
research; instructions; family planning, counseling, referrals, or any other advice in connection with
the use or procurement of contraceptives and sterilization or abortion procedures; medication; or
surgery or other care or treatment rendered by a physician or physicians, nurses, paraprofessionals
or health care facility, intended for the physical, emotional, and mental well-being of persons");
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(1) (2005) (defining "Health Care Service" to be "any phase of patient
medical care, treatment or procedure, including, but not limited to, the following: patient referral,
counseling, therapy, testing, diagnosis or prognosis, research, instruction, prescribing, dispensing or
administering any device, drug, or medication, surgery, or any other care or treatment rendered by
health care providers or health care institutions."); see also N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 6527(4)(c)
(McKinney 2006) (permitting physicians employed by certain insurers or hospitals to refuse "to
perform an act constituting the practice of medicine to which he is conscientiously opposed by
reason of religious training and belief"); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 70.47.160 (West 2006) ("No
individual health care provider, religiously sponsored health carrier, or health care facility may be
required by law or contract in any circumstances to participate in the provision of or payment for a
specific service if they object to so doing for reason of conscience or religion. No person may be
discriminated against in employment or professional privileges because of such objection.").
83. E.g., H.B. 4741, 93d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2005); H. 5085, 2005 Gen. Assem., Jan.
Sess. (R.I. 2005); A.B. 207, 97th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wis. 2005) (vetoed by Governor Jim Doyle on
October 14, 2005. Doyle, supra note 15).
84. Advance directive statutes tend to focus on physicians. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 144A.8
(West 2005). Abortion refusal laws, conversely, often include other direct providers. See, e.g., CAL.
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provide certain types of medical treatment. 85 Moreover, some more recently
adopted provisions expand coverage to include health care providers not
originally envisioned, such as pharmacists.86 In doing so, legislators are
extending the protection beyond direct providers of care to include indirect
providers of care. Pharmacists are often considered indirect providers of care
because they do not have prescriptive authority; rather, they are the "middlemen"
dispensing medications that have been prescribed by physicians. 87 Finally, many
recently enacted statutes have extended coverage beyond both direct and indirect
providers of care to embrace the insurance companies that pay for care.88
This expansion raises questions regarding how far removed from direct care
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420(a) (West 2006) ("a physician, a registered nurse, a licensed
vocational nurse, or any other person employed or with staff privileges at a hospital, facility, or
clinic [may refuse] to directly participate in the induction or performance of an abortion .. ");
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.42 (West 2006) (providing that "[n]o physician, nurse or other person who
refuses to perform or assist in the performance of an abortion").
85. Some statutes limit institutional refusal rights to private and denominational institutions.
E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-40 (2005) (providing that "[n]o private or nongovernmental hospital
or clinic shall be required to admit any patient for the purpose of terminating a pregnancy"); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 68-34-104(5) (2005) (providing that "[n]o private institution ... shall be prohibited
from refusing to provide contraceptive procedures ... when such refusal is based upon religious or
conscientious objection, and no such institution, employee, agent, or physician shall be held liable
for such refusal"); see also Wardle, supra note 28, at 182-85 (describing the coverage of
institutions in state conscience clauses).
86. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4)-(5) (2006) (permitting pharmacists to refuse to
furnish "any contraceptive procedures, supplies or information"); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(b),
-3(c), -5(1) (West 2005) (permitting pharmacists and pharmacies not to participate in any health
care service if they object on religious, moral, or ethical principles); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-
70 (2006) (permitting pharmacist not to dispense drugs that might result in abortion, euthanasia,
suicide, or mercy-killing); see also S.B. 1485, 47th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2005) (permitting
pharmacies and pharmacists not to participate in abortions, contraception, emergency
contraception, or sterilizations on "moral or religious grounds"); Baldas, supra note 8 (reporting
that, in 2004, fourteen states introduced thirty-seven bills to permit pharmacists and other health
care providers not only to refuse to participate in abortions, but also to refuse to dispense
emergency contraception or other drugs on the basis of personal "moral" objections).
87. This may explain the American Medical Association's support of legislation that requires
pharmacists to fill valid prescriptions or to refer patients immediately to other pharmacies that will
do so. AMA Passes Resolution Saying Pharmacists Should Be Required To Fill All Prescriptions or
Provide Immediate Referrals, KAISER FAM. FOUND.: DAILY REP. (June 21, 2005), http://
www.kaisemetwork.org/daily-reports/rep-index.cffm?DRID=30867.
88. E.g., Hyde-Weldon Amendment, Consolidated Appropriations Act 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-
447, Division F, Title V § 508(d), 118 Stat. 2809 (2004); MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3 (2005)
(enacting the most extensive refusal clause that has been adopted to date, covering a wide variety of
health care providers, institutions, and payers).
VI:2 (2006)
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an individual may be to qualify for protection under a refusal clause. As one
commentator inquired:
What if receptionists refused to make an appointment or refused to give the
physician a telephone message because they did not approve of something? The
pharmacist might refuse to fill a prescription, the cashier might refuse to sell
the prescribed item, or the driver of the distributor's delivery truck might refuse
to transport it.
89
There have already been cases by clerks who refused to file information about
abortion,9" a county health department employee who refused to translate into
Spanish information about abortion options,91 and an emergency medical
technician who refused to drive a woman to an abortion clinic.
92
Some of these refusal statutes require the objecting health care professional
to notify her employer of her objection to participating in a particular medical
treatment. 93 However, the states disagree as to whether written notice is
required, 94 or whether oral notification will suffice. 95 In the case of abortion, no
state requires notice to be provided at any specific time in advance of the health
care professional's refusal,96 although some states do require health plans to
provide advance notice to patients about services they do not cover in order to
give patients an opportunity to choose their insurer based upon such
knowledge.97 Regarding end-of-life care, some statutes require that institutions
89. Wolffe Nadoolman, Correspondence, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1301, 1302 (2005).
90. Spellacy v. Tri-County Hospital, No. 77-1788, 1978 WL 3437 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 23,
1978), qff'd, 395 A.2d 998 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
91. Moncivaiz v. DeKalb County, No. 03 C 50226, 2004 WL 539994 (N.D.III. Mar. 12, 2004).
92. Adamson v. Superior Ambulance Service, No. 04C 3247 (N.D. Ill. filed May 7, 2004).
93. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632.475 (2005).
94. See, e.g., id.; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (2005); see also H.B. 4741 § 5, 93d Leg., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Mich. 2005).
95. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 435.485(2) (2006) (individual must merely "notifly]" employer
of her objection).
96. But see H.B. 4741 § 6, 93d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2005) (covering all medical
services, and requiring the objecting health care provider to "assert his or her conscientious
objection": (a) "[u]pon being offered employment," (b) "[a]t the time the health care provider
adopts an ethical, moral, or religious belief system that conflicts with participation in a health care
service," or (c) "[w]ithin 24 hours after he or she is asked or has received notice that he or she is
scheduled to participate in a health care service to which he or she conscientiously objects").
97. For example, in California, health insurers, including managed care organizations, are
required to post information in their provider directories informing their members that some
providers do not offer a full range of reproductive health services, listing the specific services that
may not be available, and providing a toll-free number where consumers call to obtain more
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have written policies in place regarding objections, but require no similar
documentation for individual health care providers.98 Most statutes require
institutions and individual health care providers to provide "timely" or "prompt"
communication of their refusal policies to patients or their surrogates. 99
Meanwhile, some states either impose no notification requirement at all or
impose no time requirements.1 00 This means that patients may find themselves in
health care institutions or under the care of health care professionals who object
to the type of care they desire, without ever having received any advance
notification of the positions of these health care providers. Although the Patient
Self-Determination Act101 and the regulations promulgated pursuant to that Act
102
information about how to access such services. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1363.02 (West
2000 & Supp. 2004); CAL. INS. CODE § 10604.1 (West 1988 & Supp. 2004); CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 14016.8 (West 2001). In Washington state, health carriers are required to: "(i) provide
written notice to enrollees, upon enrollment with the plan, listing services that the carrier refuses to
cover for reason of conscience or religion; (ii) provide written information describing how an
enrollee may directly access services in an expeditious manner; and (iii) ensure that enrollees
refused services under this section have prompt access to the information developed pursuant to
(b)(ii) of this subsection." WASH. REV. CODE. § 48.43.065(b) (2006). See generally Fogel & Rivera,
Saving Roe is Not Enough, supra note 38, at 740-42.
98. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-807(e) (2005) (noting that "[a] health-care
provider may decline to comply with an individual instruction or health-care decision if the
instruction or decision appears not to be in compliance with this Act or for reasons of conscience. A
health-care institution may decline to comply with an individual instruction or health-care decision
if the instruction or decision ... is contrary to a policy of the institution that is expressly based on
reasons of conscience "); cf 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5409(b) (2005) (permitting a health care
provider's employer to require that her refusal be expressed in writing).
99. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.060(e-g) (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.16 § 2508(e) (2005);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327E-7(e) (LexisNexis 2004); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §5-807
(2005); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:6(I) (2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-7(E) (West 2005);
20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5409(a) (2005) (requiring the attending physician or health care
provider to "promptly" inform the patient); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-12(b)(2) (2005) (requiring the
individual health care provider to "promptly inform" the health care decision-maker). But see N.Y.
PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2984(3)(a) (McKinney 2006) (requiring private hospitals to inform patients or
health care agents of conscience-based refusals prior to or upon admission, if reasonably possible).
100. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-4-13 (West 2005) (imposing no requirement on the
physician to inform the patient of her objections); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 32-11-108(a) (West 2005)
(imposing no time requirements for notification).
101. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4206, 104 Stat 1388
(1990) (codified as amended in relevant part at 42 U.S.C. 1395cc(f) (2000)) (requiring health care
facilities to provide patients with written information about their rights under state law to refuse
medical treatment). Regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act require institutions to inform
patients of any written policies that limit the institution's willingness to comply with a patient's
wishes, including a clarification of "any differences between institution-wide conscience objections
VI:2 (2006)
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do require health care institutions to provide written information to patients about
their written policies, "including a clear and precise statement of limitation if the
provider cannot implement an advance directive on the basis of conscience,
' ' 03
the notice is generally provided to a patient only at the time of admission,'0 4 often
too late for a patient preparing to undergo urgent surgery to choose another
provider. Even when the patient is "on notice" that a health care institution
objects to a certain type of care because of religion-based policies, the patient
may not be in a position to obtain care elsewhere. This is the case when a patient
is brought to a hospital emergency room by ambulance. This situation may also
occur when patients, either as a result of their employment relationships or
because they are poor, are involuntarily placed into managed care programs that
restrict the facilities from which they may seek covered care. Finally, patients
seeking routine treatment are unlikely to base their hospital choice on the
hospital's position regarding a procedure that the patient assumes she will not
encounter. For example, a patient entering a hospital for a routine appendectomy
may not anticipate an "adverse medical event" that renders her permanently
unconscious, thereby triggering the need for enforcement of her advance
directive.
Unlike abortion refusal statutes, advance directive statutes usually require
individuals and institutions to cooperate in facilitating the transfer of the patient
to an institution that will comply with a patient's wishes.0 5 However, some of
these statutes leave arrangements for the transfer up to the patient's surrogate,
rather than the objecting health care professional or institution. °6 In many cases,
and those that may be raised by individual physicians." Final Regulations Promulgated Pursuant to
the Patient Self-Determination Act, 42 C.F.R. § 489.102(a)(l)(ii)(A) (2006).
102. 42 C.F.R. § 489.102.
103. 42 C.F.R. § 489.102(a)(1)(ii).
104. 42 C.F.R. § 489.102(b). In the case of home health agencies and personal care services,
notice must be provided "in advance of the individual coming under the care of the institution." 42
C.F.R. § 489.102(b)(3).
105. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:6(I) (2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-30-12(b)(2)
(West 2005). But see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.06 (West 2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
70.122.060 (West 2006); Advisory Opinion: Institutional Objections to Advance Directives, 1996
WL 925107 (N.C. Attorney Gen. May 23, 1996) (interpreting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321 (2005) as
not requiring an unwilling institution to transfer a patient).
106. E.g., W. VA. CODE § 16-30-12(b)(2) (2005) ("[T]he medical power of attorney
representative or surrogate decision maker shall have responsibility for arranging the transfer of the
person ..."); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/3(d) (West 2006) (stating that "it is the patient's
responsibility to initiate the transfer to another physician," but that, if the patient is unable to do so,
the physician must notify the patient's surrogate so that the surrogate can make transfer
arrangements). However, Illinois' broad Health Care Right of Conscience Act specifically excuses
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transferring a terminally ill patient to another institution or even another
physician within the same institution can be a difficult, if not impossible, task for
health care professionals, let alone family members. The New Jersey Supreme
Court acknowledged this in the case of In re Jobes, in which the nursing home
where the patient resided wanted to discharge her rather than comply with the
wishes of her family to withdraw her artificial nutrition. The court wrote, "it
would be extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to find another facility that
would accept Mrs. Jobes as a patient."'10 7 Presumably, this is because few
institutions would accept an unfamiliar patient for the sole purpose of
withdrawing life support. Personal and professional relationships among
physicians also often make it uncomfortable to transfer the care of patients within
a hospital.
Finally, transferring a patient at such a late stage in treatment is unduly
stressful for both the patient and her family. The Superior Court of New Jersey
considered this issue in In re Requena,10 8 when it required a hospital to comply
with a patient's request that her artificial nutrition be withdrawn, rather than
transfer her to a willing hospital seventeen miles away. The court wrote:
The subverting of hospital policy and offending the sensibilities of hospital
administrators and staff were reasonably determined... to be subordinate to
the psychological harm to be visited upon Mrs. Requena at this time .... Mrs.
Requena... finds assurance in the familiar surroundings and the familiar
nursing and professional personnel who have been taking care of her ....
[Mioving her from St. Clare's... would be a hard psychological and emotional
blow to her.1
0 9
When the medical treatment involved is controversial, such as abortion, it
may be difficult to find other willing providers in a convenient location.'10 Where
timing is crucial, for example, in the case of emergency contraception,
transferring a patient to another willing provider might delay the administration
of the drug to the point that it is no longer effective. Moreover, some health care
providers would object not only to participating in a transfer, but even to
health care providers of all types from "perform[ing] assist[ing], counsel[ling], suggest[ing],
recommend[ing], refer[ring] or participat[ing] in any way in any form of medical practice or health
care service that is contrary to his or her conscience." 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/6 (West 2006).
Presumably, this would include participating in the transfer of a patient to a willing provider.
107. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 450 (N.J. 1987); see also George Annas, Transferring the
Ethical Hot Potato, 17 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 20 (1987) (criticizing hospitals for engaging in
"ethical dumping," that is, transferring patients whose treatment choices they find objectionable).
108. In re Requena, 517 A.2d 869 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
109. Id. at 870.
110. See discussion infra Part IV.
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informing a patient of the availability of such services elsewhere. This was the
case in Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hospital,''' in which the police
brought a patient to the emergency room at a Catholic Hospital after having been
raped. Although the patient's mother inquired about the "morning-after pill," the
hospital refused to provide information concerning this treatment; moreover, it
failed to inform the patient that if she wished to receive emergency
contraception, she would have to contact another health provider within the
required time period.' 12
Refusal statutes also differ in how they address situations in which a patient
might suffer adverse consequences if she does not receive prompt medical
attention. Some statutes contain emergency exceptions; 113 that is, they do not
permit health care providers to exercise their refusal rights in emergencies.
Others do not address situations in which other health care professionals are
unavailable to provide the medically necessary care. 14 Statutes that do provide
for emergency exceptions often do not define "emergency" or provide extremely
limited definitions. 1 5 Other states address the emergency issue in a round-about
way by limiting the immunity of the refusing health care provider to situations
that do not result in serious injury or death to a patient.' 16
111. 256 Cal. Rptr. 240 (Ct. App. 1989).
112. Id. at 242.
113. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632.475 (West 2005).
114. See, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/1-14 (West 2006) (providing for no emergency
exceptions and appearing to supersede earlier requirements at 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/6, 70/9 that
did not relieve health care providers from providing care against their consciences if they had legal
obligations to provide "emergency medical care").
115. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800(1) (West 2005) (prohibiting the performance of
abortions in publicly owned health care facilities "except to save the life of the pregnant woman");
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-741 (West 2005) (permitting health care providers to refuse to
provide medical procedures in connection with an abortion "except when the aftercare involves
emergency medical procedure which are necessary to protect the life of the patient"). But see H.B.
4741, 93d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 9 (Mich. 2005) (providing a clearer definition of "emergency,"
refusing to excuse objecting health care professionals from providing treatment in the following
circumstances: "(a) A patient's condition, in the reasonable medical judgment of an attending
physician or medical director, requires immediate action and no other qualified health care provider
is available to provide that health care service. (b) In the event of a public health emergency").
116. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214(d) (West 2005) (permitting non-referral,
but specifying liability may arise if the failure to refer "would reasonably be determined as: (1)
[t]he cause of death or serious physical injury or serious long-lasting injury to the patient; and (2)
[o]therwise contrary to the standards of medical care"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-741 (West
2005) (providing that the immunities granted by the law "shall not include medical procedures in
which a woman is in the process of the spontaneous, inevitable abortion of an unborn child, the
death of the child is imminent, and the procedures are necessary to prevent the death of the
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Many of these statutes provide civil and criminal immunity to objecting
health care providers" 7 and prohibit employers from disciplining" 8 or
discriminating against these health care providers in employment. 19 Illinois law
provides for the award of treble damages, plus the costs of suit and attorney's
fees, for violations of its refusal statute. 2 ° The Pennsylvania statute further
requires all facilities offering abortions--except for those devoted exclusively to
abortion services-to post a notice entitled "Right of Conscience" for the
"exclusive purpose of informing medical personnel, employees, agents and
students of such facilities of their rights" under the law.121 Failure to post an
adequate notice may result in a civil penalty of up to $5,000.122 Yet, Pennsylvania
does not require hospitals or individual providers to notify their prospective
patients of their objections, so a patient might not realize when seeking an
abortion that the provider is unwilling to provide the service sought.
The most significant difference among the various refusal statutes pertains to
the beliefs that may be invoked to justify a refusal to provide medical treatment.
At least one state, West Virginia, authorizes individuals and institutional
providers to refuse to comply with a patient's wishes regarding end-of-life care
only on the. basis of "sincerely held religious beliefs" or "sincerely held moral
convictions." 123 However, West Virginia appears to be in a very small minority.
Many state refusal statutes, especially those regarding abortions and related
services, do not even require a health care provider to explain her reasons for
refusing to participate in treatment.' 24 The Hyde-Weldon Amendment, along with
several state statutes, adopts this approach. For example, New Jersey's abortion
refusal statute states simply: "[n]o person shall be required to perform or assist in
the performance of an abortion or sterilization.',
125 No reason must be given. 126
mother").
117. E.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/4 (West 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5(2) (West
2005); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 197.032 (West 2005).
118. E.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 333.20182 (West 2006).
119. E.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT ANN. 70/5 (West 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5(3) (West
2005); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 197.032(3) (West 2005) ("Any person who shall deny or discriminate
against another for refusal to perform or participate in an abortion shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other redress.").
120. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/12 (West 2006).
121. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(f)(1) (West 2005).
122. § 3213(f)(2).
123. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-30-12 (West 2005).
124. See generally Rachel Benson Gold & Adam Sonfield, Refusing To Participate in Health
Care: A Continuing Debate, GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL'Y, Feb. 2000, at 8, available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/03/l/gr030108.pdf.
125. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-1 (West 2006); see also ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(b) (2004)
VI:2 (2006)
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South Carolina's abortion refusal statute requires a "physician, nurse, technician
or other employee of a hospital, clinic or physician to advise the hospital, clinic
or employing physician in writing that he objects to performing, assisting or
otherwise participating in such procedure.'1 27 However, it states specifically that
"[s]uch notice will suffice without specification of the reason therefor.' 28
As of 1993, more than one-third of jurisdictions in the United States that had
enacted conscience clauses failed to state what the acceptable grounds for
conscientious objection were. 129 Lynn Wardle argues that these statutes
"irrefutably assume" that the refusal to participate in certain medical treatments
is based on conscientious objection. 130 However, some of these provisions are
drafted so broadly that they would equally protect the right of a health care
professional to refuse to participate in a medical treatment because the procedure
was scheduled too early in the moming or because the procedure was
controversial. Thus, their categorization as "conscience" clauses, rather than as
pure refusal clauses, is questionable.
Those statues that do specify that a health care professional's refusal to
participate in the provision of certain health services must be based on her
personal beliefs are often ambiguously drafted. Among the phrases used are
"moral, ethical or religious basis,"' 3' "moral or religious grounds,"'' 32 "personal
beliefs or conscience,"'' 33 "sincerely held religious beliefs or sincerely held moral
convictions,"'' 34 "reasons of conscience"'' 3
5 and "contrary to the conscience.' ' 36
(providing that "[n]othing in this section requires a hospital or person to participate in an
abortion "); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 435.485 (West 2003) ("(1) No physician is required to give
advice with respect to or participate in any termination of a pregnancy if the refusal to do so is
based on an election not to give such advice or to participate in such terminations and the physician
so advises the patient. (2) No hospital employee or member of the hospital medical staff is required
to participate in any termination of a pregnancy if the employee or staff member notifies the
hospital of the election not to participate in such terminations."); Wardle, supra note 28, at 179.
126. But see H.B. 4741, 93d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 5(2) (Mich. 2005) ("A health care provider
shall notify his or her employer in writing of a conscientious objection .... The written notice shall
be given directly to his or her supervisor and shall include a statement explaining his or her
conscientious objection and the health care service or services to which he or she specifically
objects to providing or participating in under this act.").
127. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-50(a) (2005).
128. Id.
129. Wardle, supra note 28, at 196.
130. Id. at 197.
131. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632.475 (West 2005).
132. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-2 (West 2005).
133. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. § 137-H:6 (2005).
134. E.g., W. VA. CODE § 16-30-12 (West 2005).
135. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.060(3) (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5-807(e) (2006).
25
Swartz: "Conscience Clauses" or "Unconscionable Clauses"
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
The refusal bar is set very low, permitting health care providers to refuse to
participate in a procedure with only vague justifications.
While most states do not set forth any statutory definitions of the terms they
use, the two most comprehensive and most recently passed refusal clauses do
provide a detailed definition of "conscience." The Illinois Health Care Right of
Conscience Act defines "conscience" as "a sincerely held set of moral
convictions arising from belief in and relation to God or which, though not so
derived, obtains from a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by a
deity among adherents to religious faiths." '37 The Mississippi statute defines
"'conscience" as follows:
the religious, moral or ethical principles held by a health care provider, the
health care institution or health care payer .... a health care institution or health
care payer's conscience shall be determined by reference to its existing or
proposed religious, moral or ethical guidelines, mission statement, constitution,
bylaws, articles of incorporation, regulations or other relevant documents. 
138
While the Illinois statute limits the definition of conscience to quasi-
religious moral convictions, Mississippi references religious, moral, and ethical
principles; however, it is not clear whether the legislature intended to refer to
professional or personal ethical principles, which is a crucial distinction.
Furthermore, although some statutes (at least in the case of refusals to comply
with a patient's wishes concerning life support) require institutions to have
specific written policies that define their positions, no refusal statutes require the
individual health care professional to provide in-depth justification of her
position either to the health care professional's employer or to the patient seeking
treatment. 139 Requiring health care professionals to support their objections with
detailed justification is not the answer, however. This Article maintains that
refusals for reasons other than those based on commonly accepted medical
standards should be discouraged whether or not they are supported with a
detailed explanation.
It is not clear whether state refusal clauses are sufficiently broad to protect
the rights of health care professionals not only to refuse to participate in
136. E.g., 745 ILL. COMP STAT ANN. 70/4 (West 2006).
137. 745 ILL. COMP .STAT ANN. 70/3(e) (West 2006); see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203
(West 2005) (adopting substantively the same language).
138. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(h) (West 2005).
139. But see H.B. 4741, 93d Leg., ist Reg. Sess. § 5(2) (Mich. 2005) (requiring a health care
provider to "notify his or her employer in writing of a conscientious objection," which shall include
"a statement explaining his or her conscientious objection and the health care service or services to
which he or she specifically objects to providing or participating in under this act").
VI:2 (2006)
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particular procedures, but also to refuse on the basis of their religious beliefs to
treat particular groups of patients, such as homosexuals. 4 0 For example, may a
physician refuse to perform artificial insemination for a lesbian simply because it
is against her moral beliefs for lesbians to raise children?14 1 May she refuse to
treat a homosexual with AIDS because she frowns on his sexual activities? What
about the conservative Muslim orthopedist who prefers not to treat the sports
injury of a female athlete, on the basis that under his interpretation of Islam
women should not participate in athletics? Or the physician who refuses to
deliver the ninth baby of a patient on Medicaid because she does not believe poor
people should have babies? How about the pediatrician who refuses to treat
sexually active teenagers because of her "religious convictions"?
142
Legislatures have only recently begun to address this type of selectivity
based on the status of the patient rather than on the type of procedure
requested.143 While these statutes represent a laudable effort in discouraging
health care professionals from discriminating against classes of individuals, none
of them is comprehensive in its list of protected groups. For example, while
Mississippi's statute prohibits discrimination on the basis of a patient's race,
color, national origin, ethnicity, sex, religion, creed, or sexual orientation, 44 it
does not prohibit discrimination against many other groups, including, for
example, unmarried persons. Pending legislation in Michigan offers a fairly
comprehensive list: "religion, race, color, national origin, age, gender, height,
weight, familial status, marital status, participation in high-risk activities, past or
140. However, professional ethics may discourage refusals on these bases. See, e.g., Snyder &
Leffler, supra note 29, at 565 (stating specifically that "[tihe denial of appropriate care to a class of
patients for any reason, including disease state, is unethical").
141. See, e.g., N. Coast Women's Care Med. Group, Inc. v. Superior Court, No. D045438, 2006
WL 618767 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2006); John C. Fletcher, Artificial Insemination in Lesbians,
Ethical Considerations, 145 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 419, 420 (1985) (showing no reluctance
in asserting his values in medical decision-making when he argues that since there is "no evidence
of concrete harm to such children thus far ... a physician can act ethically to help a lesbian couple
with [artificial insemination] if the partners show a prevailing pattern of responsibility"). See
generally James W. Jones et al., Ethics of Refusal To Treat Patients as a Social Statement, 40 J.
VASCULAR SURGERY 1057, 1058 (2004).
142. See, e.g., American Health Lawyers Association, Credentialing and Peer Review Listserve
(Feb. 24, 2006) (on file with author) (reporting a case involving a physician refusing to treat
sexually active teenagers because of "religious convictions").
143. E.g., MISs. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5(1) (West 2005) ("Rights of Conscience. A health care
provider has the right not to participate, and no health care provider shall be required to participate
in a health care service that violates his or her conscience. However, this subsection does not allow
a health care provider to refuse to participate in a health care service regarding a patient because of
the patient's race, color, national origin, ethnicity, sex, religion, creed or sexual orientation.").
144. Id.
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present medical disease or condition, sexual orientation, employment status,
insurance coverage, ability to pay, or method of payment."'' 45 However, the
apparent inclusiveness of this list suggests that other categories may need to be
added in the future. For example, does "gender" or "sexual orientation" cover
transgendered individuals? In fact, it is probably impossible to compile an
exhaustive list of all the possible groups that might face discrimination, thus
limiting the attempted protection afforded by this type of provision.
As the foregoing demonstrates, most states have refusal clauses that can be
exercised by both individual and institutional direct health care providers in the
context of specified medical procedures. However, the most recently enacted
refusal clauses may be invoked by all types of medical providers and payers and
may be applied to all kinds of health care services. As Wardle correctly points
out in arguing for an expansion of conscience clauses, there is every reason to
believe that, as technological innovations increase and health care professionals
become more religiously and ethnically diverse, the number of health care
professionals who object to participating in certain medical services will also
increase. 146 We already see some evidence of the expansion of refusal clauses to
include new technologies in pending legislation in Rhode Island, which
specifically includes human cloning and human embryonic stem cell research
among the health care services in which health care professionals need not
participate. 147 Before the technique of artificial insemination became generally
available, the issue as to whether it was morally appropriate to provide the
procedure to a lesbian never arose. As new technologies develop, it is likely that
at least some health care providers may object to the application of some
technology to some patient on the basis of some religious or moral belief. As
certain health care providers object to certain treatments, patients may be forced
to choose their health care provider not according to the provider's professional
abilities, but according to her religious and moral beliefs. One commentator
suggests that this may lead to a "balkanization of medicine, whereby patients will
go only to doctors of their own sect, who prescribe only for pharmacists of that
sect, and refer only to specialists of that sect.
148
145. H.B. 4741, 93d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 9(l)(d) (Mich. 2005).
146. Wardle, supra note 28, at 181.
147. H. 5085, 2005 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2005).
148. Nadoolman, supra note 89, at 1302. The beginning of "balkanization" can be seen in
Susannah Meadows, Halfway to Heaven: A Catholic Millionaire's Dream Town Draws Fire,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 27, 2006, at 39, which describes a Catholic millionaire's attempt to build a
community in southwestern Florida that represents his conservative values. He has asked that
pharmacies in the community not carry contraceptives. Naples Community Hospital, which plans to
open a clinic in the town, has agreed not to provide birth control to students, although it will
provide the pill to the general public. Id.
VI:2 (2006)
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On the contrary, this Article contends that continued expansion of the
coverage and breadth of health care professionals' refusal rights will increasingly
threaten patient access to medical care. Broader statutes create a slippery slope,
in which an increasing number of medical procedures fall into the category of
being morally objectionable to some health care professionals, and there is little
reason to think that such expansion will abate. As a result, institutions may find it
increasingly difficult to provide care and more patients will be denied access to
care. If the medical professional is subsequently viewed as placing her self-
interest before the patient's best interest, her status, as well as the status of the
medical profession writ large, will be detrimentally affected.
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF CONSCIENCE CLAUSES: THE DISPARITY BETWEEN
INSTITUTIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL REFUSALS
While state and federal legislators generally have been sympathetic to the
introduction of broad-based legislation to expand the refusal rights of health care
professionals, the courts have been somewhat less willing to grant such blanket
protection, particularly to institutional actors. 49 Courts have been relatively
unsympathetic to institutional refusals in two ways. When courts have
characterized institutions as public or quasi-public, they have been less willing to
permit the institution to refuse to provide requested care. 150 In other cases, courts
have interpreted laws so narrowly as to preclude protection for the institution.' 5 '
149. See Wardle, supra note 28, at 199; Katherine A. White, Note, Crisis of Conscience:
Reconciling Religious Health Care Providers' Beliefs and Patients' Rights, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1703,
1709-11 (1999).
150. See, e.g., Doe v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 529 F.2d 638, 642-43 (4th Cir. 1975); Wolfe
v. Schoering, 541 F.2d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 1976); Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Mat-su Coal. for Choice,
948 P.2d 963, 972 (Alaska 1997); Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Ass'n, 366 A.2d 641, 645 (N.J. 1976).
But cf Greco v. Orange Mem'l Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873, 880-81 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding that
hospital receipt of Hill-Burton grants, county funding of construction of the hospital facilities, lease
of county property, requirement under the lease from the county that the hospital accept indigent
patients, and benefits accruing to tax-exempt status were insufficient to transform the hospital into
a state actor); Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that the Church
Amendment prohibits courts from finding that a hospital that receives Hill-Burton funds is acting
under the color of state law for the purpose of deciding the applicability of the Civil Rights Statute
of 1964, 42 U.S.C § 1983 (1979)); Doe v. Bellin Mem'l Hosp., 479 F.2d 756, 757 (7th Cir. 1973)
(holding that the hospital's receipt of Hill-Burton grants and state funding, and the fact that the
hospital was subject to state regulation, was insufficient to transform it into a state actor); Jones v.
E. Me. Med. Ctr., 448 F. Supp. 1156, 1162 (D. Me. 1978) (finding that the hospital's receipt of
certain federal funds was insufficient to find "state action" under the Civil Rights Act of 1871
where there was no other state nexus).
151. Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004).
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In contrast, courts have tended to protect the rights of individual health care
professionals to refuse to participate in care, at least insofar as their refusals have
applied to reproductive services; 152 however, courts have been less likely to




Shortly after Congress enacted the Church Amendment, the Fourth Circuit
established a comparably high bar for determining whether a health care
provider's reasons for refusing to perform an abortion fell within the "moral or
religious" language of the statute.1 54 In this case, Doe v. Charleston Area Medical
Center, a plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the private,
nonprofit hospital violated her constitutional rights while acting under "color of
state law" in enforcing its policy on abortions-i.e., not permitting the
performance of abortions at its facility except where necessary to save the life of
the pregnant woman.155 The Fourth Circuit rejected the hospital's argument that
the Church Amendment precluded the court from finding that the hospital was
acting under the color of state law based on its receipt of Hill Burton funds.
156
The court found not only that the hospital's receipt of federal funds was in
itself a sufficient nexus to make it a state actor for the purposes of Section
1983,157 but it further concluded that the hospital's policy was based on its belief
152. See, e.g., Ravenstahl v. Thomas Jefferson Hosp., No. 83-5790, 1985 WL 378 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
16, 1985) (abortion); Kenny v. Ambulatory Ctr. of Miami, 400 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (abortion); Larson v. Albany Med. Ctr., 676 N.Y.S.2d 293 (App. Div. 1998) (abortion);
Swanson v. St. John's Lutheran Hosp., 597 P.2d 702 (Mont. 1979) (sterilization). But see
Disciplinary Proceeding Against Neil T. Noesen, 01 P.H.M. 080 (Wis. Pharm. Examining Bd. Feb.
28, 2005) (proposed final decision & order), affd, Noesen v. Wis. Dep't of Reg. & Licensing
Pharm. Examining Bd., No. 05CV212 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Feb. 3, 2006) (holdings by both the ALJ and
Circuit Court that the pharmacist's religion-based right to refuse to provide pharmacy services was
overridden by the patient's right to obtain her prescription for emergency contraception).
153. See, e.g., Free v. Holy Cross Hosp., 505 N.E.2d 1188 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (involving a
nurse objecting to the transfer of a patient); Warthen v. Toms River Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 488 A.2d
229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (involving a nurse failing to administer kidney dialysis to
terminally ill patient); Farnam v. Crista Ministries, 807 P.2d 830 (Wash. 1991) (involving removal
of patient's artificial nutrition).
154. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 529 F.2d at 642-643.
155. Id. at 640.
156. Hill-Burton funds are federal funds disbursed under Title VI of the Public Health Service
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 291 (2000), to assist public and nonprofit medical institutions in constructing or
modernizing their facilities.
157. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 529 F.2d at 642-43. The Court noted, however, that the receipt
VI:2 (2006)
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that the policy was required by the West Virginia criminal abortion statute,
making the hospital a state actor when it enforced its policy. 58 The court found
that the Church Amendment did not prevent it from concluding that the
hospital's receipt of Hill Burton funds made the hospital a state actor, finding
inadequate the hospital's passing reference in its supporting brief that its policy
"is naturally related to the long existing Statute of West Virginia and motivated
thereby from a moral standpoint."'' 59 The court found that this meager "attempt
[by the hospital] to invoke a moral obligation falls short of an assertion that the
policy rests upon moral and religious belief [as required to invoke the protections
of the Church Amendment] rather than the West Virginia criminal statute."'
160
Several subsequent state courts also characterized private hospitals as
"quasi-public" institutions and therefore found that they could not refuse to
perform constitutionally protected abortions.161 In 1976, the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Doe v. Bridgeton Hospital Ass 'n' 62 held that several private, nonprofit,
nonsectarian hospitals were quasi-public institutions because they were non-
profit corporations organized to serve the public, received substantial financial
support from federal and local governments and the public, benefited from tax
exemptions, were available to the public, and because their properties were
"devoted to a use in which the public has an interest and are subject to control for
the common good."' 163 As such, these hospitals could not refuse to permit their
facilities to be used for first trimester abortions under the state's refusal statute,
since to hold otherwise would constitute state action in violation of the federal
constitutional right to an abortion during the first trimester. 164
Similarly, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded in 1997 that a hospital was a
"quasi-public" institution on the grounds that it had a special relationship with
of Hill-Burton funds had been treated differently by other circuits.
158. Id. at 643 (holding that the Charleston Area Medical Center's anti-abortion policy based on
West Virginia's criminal abortion statute involved the state sufficiently to constitute the policy
"state action" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). In other words, the court found that because the hospital
policy "rests firmly upon what was thought to be the compulsion of state law ... the hospital acted
'under color of law' when it refused to allow its facilities to be used by Doe for an abortion." Id. at
644.
159. Id. at 642 n.7 (emphasis added).
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Mat-su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 972 (Alaska
1997); Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Ass'n, 366 A.2d 641, 645 (N.J. 1976). But see Greco v. Orange
Mem'l Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873, 880-81 (5th Cir. 1975); Jones v. E. Me. Med. Ctr., 448 F. Supp.
1156, 1162 (N.D. Me. 1978).
162. 366 A.2d 641, 645 (N.J. 1976).
163. Id. at 645.
164. Id. at 647.
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the state through the state's Certificate of Need program, received construction
funds from state, local, and federal governments, and also received a significant
portion of its operating funds from governmental sources; 165 as such, it could not
abridge the plaintiffs right to abortion as protected under the Alaska
Constitution. 166 The court rejected the hospital's reliance on the state's
"conscience clause" which permitted hospitals to "decline to offer abortions for
reasons of moral conscience," 167 holding that constitutional rights "cannot be
allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them." 1
68
The Sixth Circuit, in a case challenging the constitutionality of various
provisions of Kentucky's abortion statute, also distinguished the ability of
"public" hospitals from "private" facilities to invoke Kentucky's "conscience
clause," which permits hospitals, other health care facilities, and various health
providers to refuse to participate in abortions for "ethical ... moral, religious or
professional reasons."' 69 The court held that the conscience clause was not
invalid when invoked by private hospitals, but "as applied to public hospitals,
unconstitutionally interfered with the woman's constitutional right to
abortion.'
170
Like the Fourth Circuit in Charleston, other courts have rejected hospitals'
arguments that they should not be obliged to offer certain health services by
narrowly interpreting the applicable law. In 1989, a California appellate court
interpreted the refusal clause in California's Therapeutic Abortion Act as not
immunizing a Catholic hospital that refused to provide information about the
"morning-after-pill" to a rape victim, concluding that the "morning-after-pill"
was not an abortion. 17 1 At least two state courts have narrowly interpreted the
applicable refusal clauses invoked in actions brought before them, finding in each
case that, since the refusal clause specifically referred only to abortions and
sterilizations, it could not be invoked to justify the refusal of a health care
institution to participate in other types of medical procedures like withdrawing
165. Valley Hosp. Ass 'n, 948 P.2d at 972.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 971.
168. Id. at 972 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)).
169. Wolfe v. Schoering, 541 F.2d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 1976).
170. Id.
171. Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hosp., 256 Cal. Rptr. 240 (Ct. App. 1989). Whether
the "morning-after pill," otherwise known as "emergency contraception," is in fact an
abortafacient, is still being challenged by some religious health care providers. See generally
NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION AND
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artificial life support.
17 2
In the related area of state mandated contraceptive insurance coverage, the
California Superior Court, in Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior
Court,173 denied Catholic Charities' petition for declaratory relief and to enjoin
the application of California's Women's Contraception Equity Act, which would
have required the organization to provide contraceptive insurance coverage to its
employees. Narrowly interpreting the "religious employer" exemption under the
statute, the court concluded that the exemption did not apply to a charitable
corporation, like Catholic Charities: (1) for which the inculcation of religious
values is not the purpose of the entity; (2) which serves people of all faiths; (3)
which employs mainly non-Catholics; (4) which offers social services to the
general public; and (5) which benefits from a federal tax exemption.
74
The contrast between judicial and legislative approaches is clear in St. Agnes
Hospital of Baltimore v. Riddick,175 in which the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland held that a Catholic hospital was not exempt from providing
or arranging for abortion, contraception, and sterilization training in its medical
training program as required for accreditation. 176 However, the effect of the
court's decision was vitiated when Congress passed the Coats Amendment,
177
which prevents the government from denying accreditation residency training
programs that, for religious reasons, refuse to require, refer for, or arrange for
abortion training. 78 Thus, like the Church Amendment, which was a reaction to a
district court decision in Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hospital,179 the Coats
Amendment demonstrates how legislatures have taken steps to undermine the
effect of the judicial decisions that limit the rights of health care providers to
exercise refusal rights.
172. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 589-90 (D.R.I. 1988) (holding that Rhode Island's
conscience clause only covers abortion and sterilization); Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of Great Neck,
Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d 840, 847 (App. Div. 1989) (rejecting the nursing home's reliance on the Church
Amendment when it refused to withdraw a patient's artificial nutrition and hydration since it
concluded that the Church Amendment only applies to abortion and sterilization); see also Wardle,
supra note 28, at 202.
173. 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004).
174. Id. at 94-95.
175. 748 F. Supp. 319 (D. Md. 1990).
176. Id. at 331-32.
177. 42 U.S.C. § 238n (2000) (effective Apr. 26, 1996).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 238n(b). Thus, physicians training in obstetrics and gynecology in certain
religious hospitals will be certified without having the skills to provide comprehensive health care
to their patients.
179. 523 F.2d 75, 76 & n.I (9th Cir. 1975) (discussing the legislative history of the Church
Amendment).
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B. Individual Refusals
In the context of individual refusals, courts have tended to be comparatively
more sympathetic to plaintiffs who refuse to participate in abortions and
sterilizations1 80 than those who refuse to participate in other medical services,1
81
and more sympathetic to refusals based on moral or religious beliefs1 82 than those
based on professional ethical principles or public policy.' 83 However, in the cases
in which plaintiffs asserted that their refusal to participate in certain medical
services arose from their professional ethics or public policy concerns, courts
often have affirmed the validity of invoking a public policy justification even
while finding that the facts in the cases before them failed to support such a
justification.
Most cases in which courts have upheld the refusal rights of health care
professionals have involved health care professionals who have been discharged
180. See, e.g., Ravenstahl v. Thomas Jefferson Hosp., No. 83-5790, 1985 WL 378 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
16, 1985); Kenny v. Ambulatory Ctr. of Miami, 400 So. 2d 1262, 1267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Swanson v. St. John's Lutheran Hosp., 597 P.2d 702 (Mont. 1979) (finding for a nurse-anesthetist
who sued her hospital employer claiming that she had been wrongly dismissed because she had
asserted her rights under the state conscience statute, MONT. CODE. ANN. § 50-5-502 to -505
(2005), to refuse to participate in sterilization); Larson v. Albany Med. Ctr., 676 N.Y.S.2d 293
(App. Div. 1998) (finding for nurses who objected to participating in an abortion due to fetal death
after they sued their medical center employer pursuant to N.Y. Ctv. RIGHTS LAW § 79-I (McKinney
2006), which prohibits discrimination against individuals who refuse, due to conscience or religious
beliefs, to participate in an abortion).
181. See, e.g., Free v. Holy Cross Hosp., 505 N.E.2d 1188 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (finding against a
nurse attempting to sue a hospital employer under Illinois Right of Conscience Act, 745 ILL. COMP.
STATE. ANN. 70/2 (West 2006), which permits health care providers to refuse to act in
contravention to their consciences, after she was allegedly fired for objecting to the transfer of a
patient); Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980) (finding against a physician
researcher at pharmaceutical company who filed a complaint for alleged wrongful discharge after
she was fired for opposing continued research on a particular formulation of a drug, citing her
interpretation of the Hippocratic Oath); Warthen v. Toms River Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 488 A.2d 229
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (finding against a nurse who sued her hospital employer alleging
her discharge for failure to administer kidney dialysis to terminally ill patient violated public
policy); Famrnam v. Crista Ministries, 807 P.2d 830 (Wash. 1991) (finding against a nursing home
employee who sued a nonprofit Christian organization claiming religious discrimination and
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy allegedly based on the employee's reporting to
public ombudsman removal of patient's artificial nutrition).
182. See, e.g., Ravenstahl, 1985 WL 378; Kenny, 400 So. 2d 1262; Swanson, 597 P.2d 702;
Larson, 676 N.Y.S.2d 293.
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from their employment or demoted due to their religion-based refusals to
participate in abortions or sterilizations. Health care professionals have sued their
employers asserting that their termination or demotion violated a state conscience
clause, 184 a state or federal civil rights statute,' 5 the First Amendment rights to
freedom of religion and free expression of religion, 186 or public policy under the
common law.' 87 Although not specifically enacted with health care professionals
in mind, the federal statute most frequently invoked by employees of health care
institutions to protect their right of conscience is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.'8 As amended in 1972, the Civil Rights Act requires employers to
accommodate the religious beliefs of their employees unless such
accommodation results in undue hardship for the employer. 8 9 Several plaintiffs
have brought successful suits against their employers based on their employers'
alleged refusal to accommodate satisfactorily the employee's religion-based
refusals to participate in certain medical procedures.' 9 0
184. See, e.g., Moncivaiz v. DeKalb County, No. 03 C 50226, 2004 WL 539994 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
12, 2004); Free, 505 N.E.2d 1188; Swanson, 597 P.2d 702; Farnam, 807 P.2d 830.
185. See. e.g., Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2000);
Ravenstahl, 1985 WL 378; Larson, 676 N.Y.S.2d 293; Spellacy v. Tri-County Hosp., No. 77-1788,
1978 WL 3437 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 1978), a/.'"d, 395 A.2d 998 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 1978) (part-
time admissions clerk, who refused to file any forms in connection with abortions or sterilizations,
filed a Complaint in Equity against her hospital employer alleging that the hospital had violated a
provision of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955.2(a) (West
2005), which prohibits health care facilities from holding an employee liable for refusing to
participate in abortions or sterilizations).
186. See, e.g., Moncivaiz, 2004 WL 539994 (addressing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violations of the rights to freedom of speech and free exercise of religion under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments and denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment);
Ravenstahl, 1985 WL 378 (addressing claims based on the rights to freedom of religion, freedom of
speech, due process, and equal protection under the U.S. Constitution).
187. See, e.g., Pierce, 417 A.2d 505; Warthen, 488 A.2d 229; Farnam, 807 P.2d 830.
188. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (enacted 1964).
189. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000).
190. See. e.g., Moncivaiz, 2004 WL 539994 (refusing to dismiss the claim of a part-time
secretary that she was denied a promotion on the basis of her religious beliefs because she refused
to translate abortion related materials); Kenny v. Ambulatory Ctr. of Miami, 400 So. 2d 1262, 1267
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (applying Title VII analysis when interpreting Florida's refusal statute
and therefore requiring the reinstatement of a nurse who refused to participate in abortions). But
see. e.g., Shelton, 223 F.3d at 228 (finding a hospital not liable to a nurse under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e2(a)(1) (2000), since the hospital had
attempted to accommodate the nurse's religion-based objections); Ravenstahl, 1985 WL 378
(rejecting a nun-nurse's claims under the Civil Rights Acts of 1871 and 1964 that she was
discriminated against for expressing her opposition to a late abortion, stating that "persons opposed
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In Swanson v. St. John's Lutheran Hospital,91 the Montana Supreme Court
permitted a nurse anesthetist to invoke the state's conscience clause to justify her
refusal to participate in a sterilization procedure, notwithstanding the fact that she
had participated in many previous sterilization procedures without objection and
that she had not indicated at the time of her objection that her refusal was based
on the "religious beliefs or moral convictions" required by the statute.' 92 The
court found that there was "overwhelming evidence that all parties knew at the
time why she was refusing to participate,"' 93 that the Montana statute required
the objecting health care professional to state her moral or religious objections
only if requested, and that the hospital did not make such a request in this case.
Therefore, the court concluded that the nurse's failure to state the reasons for her
refusal at the time of the refusal was not determinative. The court found further
that the nurse was not bound to state the "precise commandment, dogma, or tenet
that leads to her refusal: [because t]he intent of the legislature in so providing is
manifest: A person's conscience about sterilization need not be related to any
particular religion, cult, or sect, but may be a part of the person's indefinable
concept of the natural law, not easily explained in an A-B-C fashion.' '194 Thus,
this court set a very low bar for health care professionals who choose to refuse to
participate in certain types of medical care: they need to provide only vague,
"indefinable" justification for their refusals.
Likewise, a Florida appellate court in Kenny v. Ambulatory Centre of Miami,
Florida, Inc. 195 did not focus on the substance of the religious beliefs of a nurse
who sued an ambulatory care center after she was demoted for refusing to
participate in abortions and other related birth control and sterilization
operations. Rejecting the lower court's finding that the employer's decision was
based on "fiscal necessity"' 96 and applying a federal Title VII analysis to
Florida's civil rights statute, the court concluded that accommodating the nurse
would not have created "undue hardship" for the clinic, and, thus, the nurse was
entitled to reinstatement.'
1 97
In four other cases, courts in Pennsylvania, New York, Illinois, and
California found that employees of medical centers stated causes of action under
to abortion on moral, religious, or professional grounds do not constitute the kind of class, animus
against which provides a basis for recovery under [42 U.S.C. § 1985 or 1986])," although the court
did conclude that the nurse had a cause of action under Title VII).
191. 597 P.2d 702 (Mont. 1979).
192. Id. at 704.
193. Id. at 710.
194. Id.
195. 400 So. 2d 1262.
196. Id. at 1263.
197. Id. at 1267.
VI:2 (2006)
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referenced statutes for religious discrimination based upon their religious or
moral positions against abortion. The U.S. District Court of Eastern Pennsylvania
in Ravenstahl v. Thomas Jefjerson Hospital198 concluded that a nun-nurse who
had been discharged for expressing her opposition to abortion stated a cause of
action for religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.199 Likewise, a New York appellate court found that employees who alleged
that their discharge was due to letters sent to their employer (a medical center)
announcing their moral stance against abortion stated a sufficient cause of action
for violation of New York's Civil Rights and Executive Laws, which made it an
unlawful discriminatory practice to terminate employees because of their
religious beliefs.200 The court concluded that the employees' "moral stance"
constituted "an expression held with the strength of traditional religious
conviction. 20° In Moncivaiz v. DeKalb County,2 2 the court found that a part-
time secretary stated a cause of action against the county under Title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and the Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience Act when she
claimed that she did not receive a promotion after she refused, on the basis of her
religious beliefs, to translate abortion-related information. Finally, in an
unreported case, a federal jury in Riverside, California, ordered a county public
health clinic to pay a born-again Christian nurse damages for back pay and
emotional distress, concluding that the County had violated the nurse's
constitutional right to free exercise of religion by firing her for refusing to give
patients emergency contraception.0 3
In contrast, in the Noesen case, involving the Wisconsin pharmacist who
refused to dispense birth control pills or to transfer the patient's prescription,
both the administrative law judge and the circuit court judge concluded that the
state's interest in assuring that professionals practice their professions in a
competent manner and that patients have access to requested care outweighed the
198. No. 83-5790, 1985 WL 378 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 1985).
199. Id. at *1. However, in granting the hospital's motion for partial summary judgment, the
court rejected her claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 that the hospital had conspired to
interfere with her civil rights, since it concluded not only that religion might not be the kind of
immutable trait that defines a class that is protected by the Act, but also that "persons opposed to
abortion on moral, religious, or professional grounds do not constitute the kind of class, animus
against which provides a basis for recovery under [42 U.S.C. § 1985 or 1986]." Id. at *3.
200. Larson v. Albany Med. Ctr., 676 N.Y.S.2d 293 (App. Div. 1998).
201. Id. at 296.
202. No. 03 C 50226, 2004 WL 539994 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2004).
203. Associated Press, Jury Sides with Nurse Fired for Refusing To Dispense 'Morning-After'
Pills, First Amendment Center, May 29, 2002, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?
id=3839.
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pharmacist's constitutional rights to exercise his religion freely. 20 4 The Noesen
case is an exception, however, and may be explained by the context in which it
was brought. Unlike the employment cases in which the "victim" was an
employee penalized by her employer for refusing to participate in certain medical
treatments, in Noesen the complainant was an injured patient who brought an
action before a state professional licensing board.
Notwithstanding the Noesen case, courts in most reported cases involving
employees who refused to participate in reproductive services have found in
favor of the employee. Only where plaintiffs rejected their hospital-employers'
extensive attempts to find alternative placements have courts held against
plaintiffs who objected to participating in reproductive services based on their
religious beliefs. In Spellacy v. Tri-County Hospital,20 5 a Pennsylvania court held
that a part-time admissions clerk was not protected under the Pennsylvania
abortion refusal statute when she refused to perform her clerical duties for
patients who were scheduled to have abortions. The Pennsylvania statute protects
physicians, nurses, staff members, and employees who state in writing their
"objection to performing, participating in, or cooperating in abortion or
sterilization on moral, religious or professional grounds. 20 6 However, the court
relied on specific language in Pennsylvania regulations that exclude from the
definition of "cooperation" the activity of "functioning in ancillary services, such
as... recordkeeping by clerical personnel., 20 7 The court further concluded that
even if there were a duty to accommodate the plaintiffs religious objections, the
hospital had made extensive efforts to offer the plaintiff alternative employment,
all of which had been rejected by the plaintiff.
208
Similarly, in Shelton v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey,
2 09
the Third Circuit found that the hospital had satisfied its duty when it offered to
transfer the nurse to a newborn intensive care unit. In that case, the plaintiff nurse
brought a Title VII action against a state hospital alleging that the hospital failed
to reasonably accommodate her religious beliefs when she repeatedly refused to
participate in abortions, even in emergency situations. Although the court did
acknowledge the nurse's sincere religious beliefs, it criticized her for "[h]er
unwillingness to pursue an acceptable alternative nursing position ...[which]
204. Disciplinary Proceeding Against Neil T. Noesen, 01 P.H.M. 080 (Wis. Pharm. Examining
Bd. Feb. 28, 2005) (proposed final decision & order), affd, Noesen v. Wis. Dep't of Reg. &
Licensing Pharm. Examining Bd., No. 05CV212 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Feb. 3, 2006).
205. No. 77-1788, 1978 WL 3437 (Pa. Com. P1. Mar. 23, 1978), afTd, 395 A.2d 998 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1978).
206. 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 955.2(a) (West 2005).
207. Spellacy, 1978 WL 3437, at *3.
208. Id. at *5.
209. 223 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2000).
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undermines the cooperative approach to religious accommodation issues that
Congress intended to foster.,
210
Where health care professionals have refused to participate in medical
procedures or related activities other than abortion or contraception, they have
generally based their objections on professional ethical or public policy concerns,
rather than on religious beliefs-and courts have been much less sympathetic to
their concerns.: Interpreting the Illinois Right of Conscience Act narrowly to
exclude objections based on ethical, as opposed to religious, concerns, an Illinois
appellate court, in Free v. Holy Cross Hospital,212 refused to hold in favor of a
discharged nurse. The nurse had been terminated after arguing against the
allegedly premature discharge of a patient, based on her "ethical duty as a
registered nurse not to engage in dishonorable, unethical or unprofessional
conduct. 21 3 Although the Illinois refusal statute prohibits discrimination against
health care providers who refuse, "contrary to their conscience or conscientious
convictions ... to ... deliver medical services and medical care,, 214 the court
held: "[We] do not believe that the Act contemplates the protection of ethical
concerns as opposed to sincerely held moral convictions arising from religious
beliefs.
2 15
Conversely, while the Illinois court found the Free nurse's "ethical
concerns," as opposed to her "moral convictions," to be unprotected by the state
refusal statute, two New Jersey courts found "professional ethics," as opposed to
"personal morals," to be the type of "public policy" that would justify a health
care professional's refusal to participate in an assigned task.2t 6 In these cases, the
courts distinguished refusals based on "professional ethics," which they
concluded might in some cases constitute a public policy reason for upholding
the discharged employee's right to refuse, from refusals based on the "personal
morals" of the plaintiff, which were not justifiable.
In Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,2 7 a physician sued her employer,
a pharmaceutical company, for discharging her after she refused to participate in
research involving the use of saccharine in a medication to be provided to
210. Id. at 228.
211. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980); cf Free v. Holy Cross
Hosp., 505 N.E.2d 1188 (Il. App. Ct. 1987); Famam v. Crista Ministries, 807 P.2d 830 (Wash.
1991).
212. 505 N.E. 2d 1188.
213. Id. at 1190.
214. Id. (quoting 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/2 (West 2006) (amended 1998)).
215. Free, 505 N.E.2d at 1190.
216. Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980); Warthen v. Toms River
Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 488 A.2d 229, 233 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).
217. 417 A.2d 505.
39
Swartz: "Conscience Clauses" or "Unconscionable Clauses"
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
children and elderly persons. She based her refusal on her conclusion that the
safety of saccharine was "controversial," that her interpretation of the
Hippocratic Oath prevented her from participating in such controversial research,
and that her refusal was therefore justified under the "public policy" exception to
the wrongful discharge doctrine. 218 Although the New Jersey court held in favor
of the pharmaceutical company in this case, observing that there was no public
policy (and no professional ethical code) against participating in research that is
merely asserted to be "controversial," the court noted that, in some cases, a
professional code of ethics would constitute a public policy that would justify the
physician's refusal.21 9 In the case before it, however, the court concluded that "an
employee should not have the right to prevent his or her employer from pursuing
its business because the employee perceives that a particular business decision
violates the employee's personal morals, as distinguished from the recognized
code of ethics of the employee's profession., 220 Furthermore, it observed that
"[c]haos would result if a single doctor engaged in research were allowed to
determine, according to his or her individual conscience, whether a project
should continue. 22'
Following the decision in Pierce, the New Jersey Superior Court in Warthen
v. Toms River Community Memorial Hospital222 held that public policy did not
preclude a hospital from discharging a nurse for refusing to administer kidney
dialysis to a terminally ill double-amputee patient who on previous occasions had
suffered from cardiac arrest and severe internal hemorrhaging during dialysis.
The court rejected the nurse's assertions that continuing to participate in this
treatment violated the nursing code of ethics, which obligates nurses to
"respect... human dignity. 223 Relying on Pierce, it warned against confusing
reliance on "professional ethics" with reliance on "personal morals. '224 The court
held that the nursing code provision "defines a standard of conduct beneficial
only to the individual nurse and not to the public at large" since it would have
allowed the nurse's interpretation of "human dignity" to prevail at the expense of
the patient's life and the family's wishes.225 It observed that a patient's right not
to have medical treatment terminated against his will is a public policy mandate
that "clearly outweighs any policy favoring the right of a nurse to refuse to
participate in treatments which he or she personally believes threatens human
218. Id. at 507-08.
219. Id. at 512.
220. Id. (emphasis added).
221. Id. at 514.
222. 488 A.2d 229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).
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dignity. '226 Adopting the hospital's argument, the court wrote: "It would be a
virtual impossibility to administer a hospital if each nurse or member of the
administration staff refused to carry out his or her duties based upon a personal
private belief concerning the right to live .. .
The Washington Supreme Court also distinguished between stances assumed
by health care professionals that further their own personal goals from positions
that promote the public good. In Farnam v. Crista Ministries,228 a nursing home
employee sued her nonprofit Christian organization employer after she was fired
for reporting to the state ombudsman the removal of a patient's nasal gastric tube,
which she believed was in violation of the organization's Christian principles.229
To state a cause of action under Washington's common law policy protecting
whistleblowers, the court observed that "Farnam must have been seeking to
'further the public good, and not merely private or proprietary interests. -
23
0
Since the removal of the naso-gastric tube was not illegal under state law, the
court denied Faram's claim, concluding that "[w]hile the sincerity of Farnam's
belief is not questioned, her concern appears to be directed at urging Christian
health care providers to adopt her view rather than furthering the public good.",
23'
The Shelton court, in dicta, made a similar point with respect to public
hospital employees. Citing Rodriguez v. City of Chicago,232 in which the Seventh
Circuit held that a police department had reasonably accommodated the religious
objections of a police officer who refused to guard an abortion clinic, the Third
Circuit noted:
It would seem unremarkable that public protectors such as police and
firefighters must be neutral in providing their services. We would include public
health care providers among such public protectors .... [W]e believe public
trust and confidence requires that a public hospital's health care practitioners-
with professional obligations to care for the sick and injured-will provide
226. Id. at 234 (emphasis added).
227. Id. Whether the physician in Pierce and the nurse in Warthen were, in fact, relying on
"personal morals" rather than "professional ethics" is debatable. The physician in Pierce referred
specifically to a clause in the Hippocratic Oath which read: "I will prescribe regimen for the good
of my patients according to my ability and my judgment and never do harm to anyone." Pierce v.
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 513 (N.J. 1980). The nurse in Warthen referred to language
regarding "human dignity" in the Nursing Code, Warthen, 488 A.2d at 233.
228. 807 P.2d 830 (Wash. 1991).
229. Id. at 832.
230. Id. at 836 (quoting Dicomes v. State, 782 P.2d 1002, 1008 (Wash. 1989)).
231. Farnam, 807 P.2d at 836 (emphasis added).
232. 156 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 1998).
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treatment in time of emergency.233
The Rodriguez court was concerned that the police officer's invocation of
his personal religious views to justify his refusal to guard an abortion clinic
would have a negative impact on public safety.234 Similarly, in Kalman v. Grand
Union Co., 2 35 the court expressed concern about the public's safety. In that case,
a pharmacist refused to leave un-staffed a pharmacy counter in a grocery store,
contrary to the grocery store manager's instructions, because he said that both
state law and his professional code of ethics required the pharmacy to be staffed
at all hours during which the grocery store remained open. The court found that
the pharmacy code's requirement and the public interest both supported having
the pharmacy counter staffed at all times because leaving the counter un-staffed
"would have exposed the public to the risk that dangerous drugs might be
accessible to the public . ,236 Thus, the court remanded the case to determine
whether the pharmacist's discharge had in fact resulted from his refusal to close
the counter.23 7
The risk to the public of a physician's refusal to treat patients was also
essential to the court's holding in Fineman v. New Jersey Department of Human
238Services. In that case, a physician brought an action against his employer under
the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA)239 after he was
discharged from a nursing home for refusing to treat patients not assigned to him
in order to "cover" for another physician who was on vacation. The physician
had contended that taking responsibility for so many patients would violate his
ethical responsibilities based on the Hippocratic Oath and the American Medical
Association Principles of Medical Ethics.2 40 The court distinguished between
expressing one's objections, which is protected by CEPA, and "overt acts such as
refusal to give medical assistance, 2 41 which are not protected by the law.
233. Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 228 (3d Cir. 2000) (emphasis
added).
234. Rodriguez, 156 F.3d at 779-80.
235. 443 A.2d 728 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).
236. Id. at 730.
237. Id. at 731.
238. 640 A.2d 1161 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
239. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3(c)(3) (West 2006) ("An employer shall not take any retaliatory
action against an employee because the employee ... [o]bjects to, or refuses to participate in any
activity, policy or practice which the employee reasonably believes.., is incompatible with a clear
mandate of public policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare or protection of the
environment.").
240. Fineman, 640 A.2d at 1166.
241. Id. at 1170.
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Moreover, the court observed:
When a professional employee merely raises an objection, the consequences,
and therefore the necessary weighing of competing interests, are apt to differ
materially from those produced when the objection is expressed by overt acts
such as refusal to give medical assistance .... Given the advanced age of most
residents, it can reasonably be assumed that [the] plaintiffs refusal to see or
treat residents whose needs were brought to his attention by the nursing staff,
could itself raise competing questions of medical ethics and responsibility.
242
Thus, the court concluded that "a balancing of interests test [the physician's
interpretation of his medical ethics as weighed against the health interests of the
nursing home residents] could not here support an objectively reasonable
determination that there was a clear ethical and legal mandate of public policy
requiring a physician to refuse to treat patients in distress.,
243
The administrative law judge in Noesen engaged in the type of balancing test
referred to in Fineman, but found herself in the position of weighing a health care
professional's religious beliefs, as opposed to his professional ethics, against the
potential harm to a patient. 244 After hearing testimony from pharmacist experts
about the appropriate standard of care for pharmacists and referencing the
American Pharmacist Association's Policy Committee Report on Conscience
Clauses and the Pharmacist Code of Ethics, Administrative Law Judge Baird
concluded that Noesen had departed from the "standard of care ordinarily
exercised by a pharmacist and which harmed or could have harmed the
patient.",245 In arriving at this conclusion, she pointed specifically to Noesen's
failure to inform the managing pharmacist or pharmacy that he would not transfer
a prescription for contraceptives, his refusal to advise the patient of her options in
getting her prescription filled elsewhere, his failure to ask the patient if she had
any medical conditions that might be adversely affected by a pregnancy, and his
refusal to transfer the patient's prescription to another pharmacy. 246 Baird
observed that Noesen was more concerned with "satisfying his own personal
242. Id. (emphasis added).
243. Id. at 1171. The clarity of the public mandate was also an issue in Birthisel v. Tri-Cities
Health Services Corp., 424 S.E.2d 606 (W. Va. 1992), in which the court found that a Social Work
Code of Ethics did not provide sufficiently specific guidance to justify a social worker's refusal to
add information to the hospital's Master Treatment Plan in preparation for a visit from an
accreditation team.
244. Disciplinary Proceeding Against Neil T. Noesen, 01 P.H.M. 080 (Wis. Pharm. Examining
Bd. Feb. 28. 2005) (proposed final decision & order), afi'd, Noesen v. Wis. Dep't of Reg. &
Licensing Pharm. Examining Bd., No. 05CV212 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Feb. 3, 2006).
245. Id. at 7.
246. Id. at 18-19.
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moral code" than with the health interests of the patient.247 Among other
penalties, Judge Baird ordered that Noesen's license be restricted for two years
and required him to attend ethics classes. 248 In addition, she ordered him to
submit to future employers a detailed notice of the procedures he refuses to
perform, as well as the steps he will take to ensure a patient's access to
medication is not impeded by his refusal.249 Judge Baird's decision was affirmed
by the Barron County Circuit Court.250 The Circuit Court also addressed
Noesen's argument that the free exercise of religion protected by the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of the Wisconsin
State Constitution exempted him from complying with the requirements of the
Wisconsin Pharmacy Code. Applying a compelling interest/least restrictive
means test as required by the Wisconsin Constitution, the court found that the
state had compelling interests "in ensuring that health care professionals practice
in a competent manner" 251 as well as "in ensuring that patients are able to access
the medications that have been prescribed to them.,
252
In balancing the potential harm to the patient against the religious rights of
the pharmacist, both Judge Baird and the appellate court in Noesen concluded
that the state's dual compelling interests in assuring that professionals perform
their duties in a competent fashion and that patients receive their prescribed
medication were sufficient to override the pharmacist's right to freely exercise
his religious beliefs. The Noesen case presents a promising approach toward
limiting the effect of legislatively enacted refusal clauses-an approach that is
consistent with the thesis of this Article. Since refusing to provide medically
indicated treatment arguably violates the standard of care required by various
state professional regulations, and thereby potentially endangers patient health,
aggrieved patients might bring disciplinary actions against offending
professionals before applicable state professional boards. Although Noesen did
not address the issue of patient abandonment, aggrieved patients might make
abandonment arguments in cases in which a health care professional has an
ongoing relationship with a patient, arguing that the refusal to treat the patient
constitutes an "abandonment" of the health care professional's responsibility to
her patients. Like the failure to satisfy the general standard of care required by
health care professionals, patient abandonment also often constitutes
"unprofessional conduct" under various states' professional licensing
247. Id. at 7.
248. Id. at 7-8.
249. Id. at 7.
250. Noesen v. Wis. Dep't of Reg. & Licensing Pharm. Examining Bd., No. 05CV212, slip op.
at 17 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Feb. 3, 2006).
251. Id. at 15.
252. Id. at 16.
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regulations.
Judge Baird and the appellate court in Noesen are in the minority in
penalizing a health care professional for refusing to provide treatment to a patient
on the basis of his religious beliefs. However, the Noesen courts are also in the
minority in that they were confronted with a patient who was injured as a result
of a health care professional's assertion of his refusal rights. In contrast, the
courts in the employment cases faced discharged or demoted health care
professionals as the aggrieved plaintiffs. Once injury to patients is at issue, it may
be more difficult for courts to be sympathetic to the health care professional's
assertion of her refusal rights.
Thus, with the Noesen case as a noted exception, most courts have tended to
protect the rights of individual health care professionals to refuse to participate in
medically indicated treatment on the basis of the health care professional's
personal religious beliefs, even if such beliefs are "indefinable., 254 This is
especially true in cases in which the medical treatment involved is abortion.255 In
contrast, courts generally have interpreted the common law public policy
exception specifically to exclude reliance on personal beliefs, as opposed to
professional ethics or the "public good." As the New Jersey courts have pointed
out, allowing the personal religious or moral beliefs of each individual health
care professional to determine whether she will practice her profession could
potentially create chaos for health care administration and patient care.256 On the
other hand, allowing a health care professional to object to participating in
patient treatment because of generally accepted professional ethics is unlikely to
have such ramifications simply because professional standards have been
developed by consensus and, over time, these standards can easily be shared in
253. See, e.g., 49 PA. CODE § 16.61 (2006) (stating, in relevant part, that a physician commits
"unprofessional conduct" when she "abandon[s] a patient. Abandonment occurs when a physician
withdraws his services after a physician-patient relationship has been established, by failing to give
notice to the patient of the physician's intention to withdraw in sufficient time to allow the patient
to obtain necessary medical care").
254. Swanson v. St. John's Lutheran Hosp., 597 P.2d 702, 710 (Mont. 1979).
255. In view of the fact that abortion is the only type of medical care that enjoys specific
constitutional protection, this finding is paradoxical and suggests a failure to attribute sufficient
weight to the state's interest in protecting the right to abortion in balancing this interest against the
health care professional's religious or moral beliefs. The Alaska Supreme Court made this point in
Valley Hospital Ass'n v. Mat-su Coalition/br Choice, 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997), in which it held
against a quasi-public hospital that refuscd to permit abortions on the basis of its moral beliefs
because "constitutional rights 'cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with
them."' Id. at 979 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)).
256. Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 514 (N.J. 1980); Warthen v. Toms River
Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 488 A.2d 229, 234-5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).
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advance with the public.
Focusing on the individual's rights of conscience, both refusal statutes and
civil rights legislation generally do not consider the ramifications of the health
care professional's refusal on patient care. In contrast, when courts have
considered health care professionals' refusals in the context of public policy, the
effects of the refusals have had a substantial influence on the courts' conclusions.
The effects of refusal were central to the courts' holdings in Kalman, where the
possibility of public access to dangerous drugs was considered an unacceptable
public risk,257 and in Noesen, where harm to the public was made concrete by the
injured plaintiff.258 In line with this reasoning by courts, this Article posits that,
in considering the potential ramifications of the health care professional's refusal
to provide care, there should be an affirmation of the general rule that the
personal interests of health care professionals should not be permitted to prevail
over the health needs of their patients.259
III. PROFESSIONALS' RIGHTS OF REFUSAL VERSUS PATIENT AUTONOMY
The trend toward expanding health care professionals' rights to refuse to
participate in certain types of medical care has overlapped with an opposing trend
toward increasing patients' rights to direct their own medical care. Since the end
of World War II, there has been a trend toward respecting patients' autonomous
decisions, notwithstanding the objections of physicians or medical institutions.26°
Alan Meisel has called this trend toward "the assertion of citizen autonomy,'26' as
reflected, in part, by the recognition of individual autonomy in the doctor-patient
relationship, "the greatest revolution of twentieth century American society. '262
Prior to the post-World War II period, most medical decisions were made by
physicians with little input from patients. This model of medical decision-making
257. Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 443 A.2d 728, 730 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).
258. Disciplinary Proceeding Against Neil T. Noesen, 01 P.H.M. 080 (Wis. Pharm. Examining
Bd. Feb. 28, 2005) (proposed final decision & order), ajd, Noesen v. Wis. Dep't of Reg. &
Licensing Pharm. Examining Bd., No. 05CV212 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Feb. 3, 2006).
259. See also Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 228 (3d Cir. 2000)
("It would seem unremarkable that public protectors such as police and firefighters must be neutral
in providing their services. We would include public health care providers among such public
protectors .... [W]e believe public trust and confidence requires that a public hospital's health care
practitioners-with professional obligations to care for the sick and injured-will provide treatment
in time of emergency.").
260. Alan Meisel, Managed Care, Autonomy, and Decisionmaking at the End of Life, 35 Hous.
L. REv. 1393 (1999).
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has been referred to as "medical paternalism" and has been defined as "an action
taken by one person in the best interests of another without their consent., 263 This
principle is illustrated by the case of John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v.
Heston,264 in which the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a twenty-two year
old woman's physician was justified in ordering a life-saving blood transfusion
over the patient's surrogate's religion-based objections. The court reached this
ruling not only because the state had a compelling interest in the preservation of
life, but also because permitting the physician to act otherwise would violate the
professional standards of the medical staff. The court wrote:
Hospitals exist to aid the sick and the injured. The medical and nursing
professions are consecrated to preserving life. That is their professional
creed .... When the hospital and staff are ... involuntary hosts and their
interests are pitted against the belief of the patient, we think it reasonable to
resolve the problem by pennitting the hospital and its staff to pursue their
functions according to their professional standards.
265
However, beginning slowly in the post-World War I period and quickly
following the World War 11 period,266 challenges to authority resulted in a trend
263. David C. Thornasma, Beyond Medical Paternalism and Patient Autonony." A Model of
Physician Conscience/br the Physician-Patient Relationship, 98 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 243,
244 (1983) (citing James F. Childress, Paternalism and Health Care, in MEDICAL RESPONSIBILITY:
PATERNALISM, INFORMED CONSF.NT, AND EUTHANASIA 15, 18 (Wade L. Rovison & Michael S.
Pritchard eds., 1979)). Thomasma provides the example of a physician who recommends a bypass
operation to save a patient's life, while the patient prefers medications over surgery. If the
physician tries to talk the patient into the surgery "for his own good," he is acting paternalistically.
Thomasma, supra, at 246.
264. 279 A.2d 670 (N.J. 1971), overruled in part by In re Conroy, 486 A.2d. 1209 (N.J. 1984)
(overruled to the extent that the court attributed more weight to the physicians' professional creed
than to the competent patient's privacy rights); see also In re Application of the President and
Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (ordering a hospital to
administer a blood transfusion over the religious objections of a twenty-five year old woman in part
because she had voluntarily sought medical attention and had exposed the hospital and its doctors
to potential civil and criminal liability either for administering the transfusion or allowing her to
die); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 754 (D. Conn. 1965) (emphasizing that a patient
should not be able to dictate a course of treatment that required his physicians to ignore their own
conscience and to commit virtual malpractice).
265. Heston, 279 A.2d at 673.
266. The exposure of war-time atrocities after WWII resulted in a renewed interest in individual
rights as exemplified by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Ist plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810
(Dec. 12. 1948). Shocking revelations concerning abuses in medical research by the Nazis resulted
in the Nuremberg Code, The Niurenberg Code. in 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
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of rejecting paternalism in various institutions (including unions, schools, and
families) 267 and placing enhanced value on the rights of the individual. As the
result of the growing consumer and civil rights movements of the 1950s and
1960s, the emphasis among both medical ethicists and the courts began to center
on a model of medical decision-making that emphasized patient autonomy and
self-determination, rather than physicians' rights. In this model, it is the
competent patient, not the physician, who ultimately makes decisions regarding
her care, based on the physician's description of the relative risks, benefits, and
alternatives available. This model is reflected in the doctrine of informed
consent, which has become the "core principle of American bioethics. 268
The law of informed consent originated in the oft-quoted statement by Judge
Cardozo in the case of Scholendorfif v. Society of New York Hospital: "Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body .... 269 Subsequent cases have affirmed the concept
of informed consent and further delineated its legal requirements27 0 such that it is
now generally accepted that physicians must obtain their patients' consent before
treating them and that such consent is not valid unless it is "informed;" that is,
unless the physician has disclosed to the patient the benefits, risks, and possible
alternatives to treatment.271
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 181-82 (1949), which
emphasized the voluntary consent of individuals prior to their participation in research, and the
subsequent development of the Belmont Report, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, BELMONT
REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
RESEARCH (1979), available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/Belmont.html. The Belmont
Report emphasized the rights of individuals with decision-making capacity:
An autonomous person is an individual capable of deliberation about personal goals and
of acting under the direction of such deliberation. To respect autonomy is to give weight
to autonomous persons' considered opinions and choices while refraining from
obstructing their actions unless they are clearly detrimental to others. To show lack of
respect for an autonomous agent is to repudiate that person's considered judgments, to
deny an individual the freedom to act on those considered judgments, or to withhold
information necessary to make a considered judgment, when there are no compelling
reasons to do so.
Id. at B(l). These concepts have been applied both by biomedical ethicists and the courts not
only in research, but also in clinical contexts.
267. Meisel, supra note 260, at 1398.
268. Id. at 1399.
269. 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
270. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F. 2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
271. See, e.g., Med. Care Availability & Reduction of Error Act of 2002, 40 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1303.504(b) (2005) (effective 2002) ("Consent is informed if the patient has been given a
description of a procedure set forth in subsection (a) and the risks and alternatives that a reasonably
VI:2 (2006)
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Just as individuals have the right to consent to treatment, they also have the
right to refuse treatment. 2 2 That right has been tested and upheld, most often in
cases in which a patient's life is threatened due to his refusal of life-sustaining or
life-prolonging treatment.27 3 However, the patient's right to refuse treatment is
not absolute. It is balanced against four state interests: the preservation of life, the
protection of dependents, the prohibition against suicide, and the protection of
the "integrity of medical professionals.,
274
In general, the "integrity of medical professionals" has not been afforded
significant weight in these end-of-life cases because courts have concluded that
recognizing the right of the patient to refuse life-prolonging treatment does not,
in fact, compromise medical ethics. As the court noted in Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz:
Prevailing medical ethical practice does not, without exception, demand that all
efforts toward life prolongation be made in all circumstances. Rather... the
prevailing ethical practice seems to be to recognize that the dying are more
often in need of comfort than treatment. Recognition of the right to refuse
necessary treatment in appropriate circumstances is consistent with existing
medical mores; such a doctrine does not threaten either the integrity of the
medical profession, the proper role of hospitals in caring for such patients or
the State's interest in protecting the same .... [I]f the doctrines of informed
consent and right of privacy have as their foundations the right to bodily
integrity ... and control of one's own fate, then those rights are superior to the
institutional considerations.
275
As a result, most subsequent courts that have faced this issue have concluded that
prudent patient would require to make an informed decision as to that procedure. The physician
shall be entitled to present evidence of the description of that procedure and those risks and
alternatives that a physician acting in accordance with accepted medical standards of medical
practice would provide.").
272. Meisel, supra note 260, at 1400.
273. See Martha Swartz, The Patient Who Refuses Medical Treatment: A Dilemma for Hospitals
and Physicians, 11 AM. J.L. & MED. 147, 155-63 (1985).
274. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass. 1977)
(holding that a mentally incapacitated patient suffering from acute myeloblastic monocytic
leukemia had the right, through his surrogates, to refuse chemotherapy).
275. Id. at 426-27; see also Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 303-04 (Ct. App.
1986) ("Where the performance of one duty [to sustain life] conflicts with the other [to relieve
suffering], the choice of the patient ... should prevail.") (quoting COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL
AFFAIRS, AM. MED. Ass'N, WITHHOLDING OR WITHDRAWING LIFE PROLONGING MEDICAL
TREATMENT (1986)); Alan Meisel, Refiusing Treatment, Reising To Talk and Refusing To Let Go:
On Whose Terms Will Death Occur, 17 L. MED. & ETHICS 221 (1989).
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the patient's right to refuse life-prolonging treatment, based on her right to
privacy, her liberty interests, or her right to self-determination, should prevail
over objections based on outdated concepts regarding what constitutes prevailing
medical ethics. As Alan Meisel, a legal authority on the right to die, points out,
"[n]ot a single reported case-certainly not a right-to-die case in which the
patient was terminally ill and would die relatively soon even if treatment were
administered-has ever found this interest [medical integrity] to outweigh a
patient's claim not to be treated.,
276
Even in cases in which health care providers raised religious objections to
disconnecting a seriously ill patient's ventilator, courts have concluded that the
physicians had a professional obligation to support the patient's wishes. For
example, in Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center,27 7 a competent adult
patient with serious, but not terminal, illnesses requested that his ventilator be
withdrawn. The hospital submitted a declaration "to the effect that [Glendale
Adventist] is a Christian, pro-life oriented hospital, the majority of whose doctors
would view disconnecting a life-support system in a case such as this one as
inconsistent with the healing orientation of physicians., 27 8 However, while the
court did "not doubt the sincerity of real parties' moral and ethical beliefs, or
their sincere belief in the position they have taken in this case," it held that "if the
right of the patient to self-determination as to his own medical treatment is to
have any meaning at all, it must be paramount to the interest of the patient's
hospital and doctors., 27 9 Thus, the court held that the lower court erred in
denying the patient's petition for a mandatory injunction.2 80
Chemotherapy and artificial ventilation are not the only types of treatment
that courts have approved withdrawing, in compliance with a patient's wishes.
Courts have also condoned the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration
276. Alan Meisel, supra note 275, at 223-24; see also Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 301 (declaring,
in a case involving the right to refuse medical intervention, including nutrition, that the patient's
"right to refuse medical treatment is basic and fundamental .... Its exercise requires no one's
approval. It is not merely one vote subject to being overridden by medical opinion."); In re
Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 14 (Fla. 1990) (noting that maintenance of the ethical
integrity of the medical profession is the least significant of various State interests in a case
involving the right to direct medical treatment). But cf McIver v. Krischer, 697 So. 2d 97 (Fla.
1997) (reversing a lower court order of declaratory and injunctive relief and noting that the state
has a compelling interest in maintaining the integrity of the medical profession in the context of a
patient's request for a physician's assistance in committing suicide).
277. 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984).
278. Id. at 225.
279. Id. The patient's intervening death rendered the case moot, so no court order to transfer the
patient was considered.
280. Id. at 226 & n.8.
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upon a patient's or surrogate's request, even though there was at one time a
controversy within the medical community about withholding care that was
considered "ordinary," like artificial nutrition and hydration, as opposed to care
that was considered "extraordinary," like ventilators.28' For example, in In re
.Jobes,282 a private nursing home opposed, on religious grounds, a patient
representative's request for the removal of a terminally ill patient's feeding tube.
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the patient's privacy rights superseded
the refusal rights of the institution and staff and declined to allow the nursing
home to continue the patient's artificial feeding while the patient awaited
283 284transfer.283 One year earlier, in In re Requena, the New Jersey Superior Court
had similarly required a Catholic medical center to comply with a patient's
wishes to have her artificial feeding tube withdrawn, reasoning that "the
subverting of hospital policy and offending the sensibilities of hospital
administration and staff were reasonably determined... to be subordinate to the
psychological harm to be visited upon Mrs. Requena at this time. 28 5
281. The early end-of-life cases established a distinction between "extraordinary" care, e.g.,
ventilators, that are extremely invasive and "ordinary" care, e.g., naso-gastric feeding tubes, that
are not very invasive and that provide "comfort care." See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.
1976). But see Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 637 (Mass. 1986). The
Bropohy court took note of evolving standards within the medical ethical community when it
concluded that its primary focus should be on the patient's "desires and experience of pain and
enjoyment-not the type of treatment involved." Id. at 636. However, because it found that "[t]here
is substantial disagreement in the medical community over the appropriate medical action," and
more importantly, because the hospital was willing to transfer the patient to a willing institution,
the court refused to order physicians, over their ethical objections, to discontinue the artificial
nutrition and hydration of a terminally ill patient at the patient's guardian's request. Id. at 639.
282. 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987).
283. Id. at 450-51.
284. 517 A.2d 869 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986); cf Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 638-40.
285. In re Requena, 517 A.2d. at 870; see also Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 591 (D.R.I.
1988): Bartling, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984); Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc.,
544 N.Y.S.2d 840, 848 (App. Div. 1989); Wardle, supra note 28, at 211-15; cf Broplv, 497 N.E.2d
626; Conservatorship of Morrison, 253 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a
physician had the right to refuse on "personal moral grounds" to follow a patient's conservator's
direction to remove a life-sustaining naso-gastric tube from a patient as long as the physician was
willing to transfer the patient). The court in Morrison refrained from ruling on whether a physician
could refuse to comply with a conservator's request if no physician were available who agreed to
comply with the conservator's wishes, writing: "The issue of whether a court could compel
physicians to act contrary to their ethical views is too profound for gratuitous discussion in a
dictum." Morrison, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 535. The court uses the word "moral" interchangeably with
the word "ethical," so that it is unclear whether the court is referring to the physician's personal
moral beliefs or his interpretation of his profession's ethical guidelines.
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Thus, in end-of-life cases, it is generally accepted within both the medical
community and the judiciary that a patient's autonomous wishes should prevail
over a health care provider's objections to terminating care. Moreover, courts
have even found in favor of patients when physicians and institutions have
asserted religion-based objections to terminating treatment.286 This is in contrast
to cases involving health care professionals who object to participating in
reproductive health care where courts often have been sympathetic to religion-
based objections.287
Many commentators have concluded that while health care professionals
may be required to respect a patient's right to refuse treatment, respect for patient
autonomy cannot compel health care professionals affirmatively to provide
treatment requested by patients, but to which the medical professional objects.288
These commentators point out that the law routinely distinguishes between
honoring a patient's decision to refuse care and honoring a patient's decision to
demand care. 289 The President's Commission on Biomedical Ethics specifically
declares, "[a]lthough competent patients ... have the legal and ethical authority
to forego some or all care, this does not mean that patients may insist on
286. See, e.g., Bartling, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220; Jobes, 529 A.2d 434.
287. See, e.g., Ravenstahl v. Thomas Jefferson Hosp., No. 83-5790, 1985 WL 378 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
16, 1985); Kenny v. Ambulatory Ctr. of Miami, 400 So. 2d 1262, 1267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Larson v. Albany Med. Ctr., 676 N.Y.S.2d 293 (App. Div. 1998).
288. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. &
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING To FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
(1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N]; Eric M. Levine, A New Predicament for Physicians:
The Concept of Medical Futility, the Physician's Obligation To Render Inappropriate Treatment,
and the Interplay of the Medical Standard of Care, 9 J.L. & HEALTH 69 (1994-1995); James J.
Murphy, Beyond Autonomy: Judicial Restraint and the Legal Limits Necessary To Uphold the
Hippocratic Tradition and Preserve the Ethical Integrity of the Medical Profession, 9 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 451 (1993).
289. U.S. v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 754 (D. Conn. 1965) ("[T]he doctor's conscience and
professional oath must ... be respected .... [The patient in this case] sought to dictate to treating
physicians a course of treatment amounting to medical malpractice .... The patient may
knowingly decline treatment, but he may not demand mistreatment."); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404,
412 (N.J. 1987) (observing that "even as patients enjoy control over their medical treatment, health-
care professionals remain bound to act in consonance with specific ethical criteria .... [A] patient
has no right to compel a health-care provider to violate generally accepted professional standards").
But see Jobes, 529 A.2d at 450 (holding that a nursing home that had no formal policy against
withdrawing artificial nutrition must comply with a family's wishes to withdraw artificial nutrition
from a patient in a permanent vegetative state since the family "had no reason to believe that they




Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 6 [2006], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol6/iss2/2
CONSCIENCE CLAUSES OR UNCONSCIONABLE CLAUSES
particular treatments., 290 No medical association has recognized the right of
patients to demand any treatment they want.291 For example, a physician cannot,
at a patient's request, be compelled to prescribe antibiotics for a virus or to
perform heart surgery when the physician believes that medication is likely to
produce similar results with less risk.
However, a number of courts have refuted this position by ordering that
medical professionals provide therapy that the health care professional considers
"ineffective" or not beneficial to the patient. For example, in In Re Wanglie,292 a
Minnesota court rejected a hospital's and physician's argument that the care of a
patient in a persistent vegetative state-dependent on a ventilator for breathing
and a nasogastric tube for feeding-should be withdrawn because further care
would be, according to the physicians, "non-beneficial" and "medically
inappropriate. 29 3 The court concluded that the patient's husband was the
appropriate decision-maker, and, since he had not requested the termination of
treatment, the physicians could not initiate a withdrawal order.294
Several commentators have pointed out that the treatment requested by the
patient's husband-conservator in the Wanglie case was not "medically futile"
since it had the desired effect; that is, it maintained the patient's life. Conversely,
the patient's physicians considered continued treatment to be "medically futile"
in the sense that, in the physicians' opinions, being kept alive would be of no
benefit to the patient in light of her hopeless prognosis. This conclusion, these
commentators suggest, was not scientifically based, but rather was based on the
physician's "values," which conflicted with those of the patient's conservator
who believed that a "miracle" would save his wife.2 95 Since "[t]he physicians in
no way could claim expertise in knowing the value of their patient's vegetative
life," their recommendations should not be decisive.296 According to this logic,
the patient's autonomous treatment preferences (as expressed by her conservator)
were correctly attributed more weight by the court than the physicians' "medical
integrity. ' '297
290. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 288, at 44.
291. See Murphy, supra note 288, at 478.
292. In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1991), reprinted in 7 ISSUES IN L. & MED.
369 (1991).
293. Robert M. Veatch & Carol Mason Spicer, Medically Futile Care: The Role of the
Physician in Setting Limits, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 15, 21 (1992) (discussing Wanglie, No. PX-91-
283) (citations omitted).
294. Wanglie, No. PX-91-283.
295. Murphy, supra note 288, at 457.
296. Veatch & Spicer, supra note 293, at 29; see also Murphy, supra note 288, at 463.
297. The Wanglie court did not engage in balancing the physicians' "medical integrity" against
the patient's autonomy since it limited itself to deciding who the appropriate decision-maker should
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Similarly, in In re Doe, 298 a case involving a thirteen-year-old girl with a
neurological degenerative disorder, massive brain damage, and no reasonable
hope of recovery, the physicians and the hospital bioethics committee
recommended, over the girl's parents' objections, that all extraordinary life-
sustaining measures be discontinued. One of the treating physicians concluded
that "[i]t's to the point the patient is being abused through medical
technology., 299 This physician further testified that he found it "ethically and
morally unconscionable" to continue treatment.300  Notwithstanding this
testimony, as well as evidence that the lingering death of the patient "was having
a disastrous effect on the Hospital personnel and [was] demoralizing to the
nursing and house staff,, 30 1 the court rejected the hospital's and physicians'
request to discontinue life support. Instead, physicians were required to continue
therapy that they found inappropriate.30 2
Veatch and Spicer distinguish between "physiologically futile care," that is,
care that is not technically effective in that it is unlikely to achieve the medical
goal (for instance, antibiotics will not cure a virus), and "normatively futile care,"
that is, care that will not produce a "worthwhile outcome. '30 3 Veatch and Spicer
conclude that the patient herself, and not the physician, is the "appropriate
be, not what the decision should be.
298. 418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992).
299. Judge Rules Parents May Keep Comatose Child Alive, CHICAGO TRIB., Oct. 18, 1991, at
C4.
300. Id.
301. Murphy, supra note 288, at 458 (quoting In re Doe, No. D-93064, slip op. at 23 (Ga.
1991)).
302. See also In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 597 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that the Emergency
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000), "does not provide an
exception for stabilizing treatment [that] physicians may deem medically or ethically
inappropriate," finding that EMTALA preempts the Virginia statute that does provide such an
exception, and therefore requiring physicians to treat an anencephalic infant, notwithstanding the
physician's argument that it was outside the prevailing standard of medical care to treat
aggressively an infant without a complete brain who was doomed to die within a short time); Gray
v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 589, 591 (D.R.I. 1988) ("[C]onsideration of the integrity of medical
ethics does not present a compelling justification to refuse Marcia Gray's wishes. Indeed, medical
ethics incorporates the principle that the patient, not the health care provider, determines what the
course of care should be .... Accordingly, if Marcia Gray cannot be promptly transferred to a
health care facility that will respect her wishes, the Rhode Island Medical Center must accede to
her requests."); John J. Paris, Physicians' Refusal of Requested Treatment: The Case of Baby L.,
322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1012 (1990) (describing In re Baby L, in which a mother sought continued
treatment for her two year old child who suffered from repeated bouts of pneumonia and
cardiopulmonary arrests, but who was unresponsive, except to pain. Physicians unanimously agreed
that further medical intervention was not in the best interests of the patient. Ultimately, the case
was rendered moot when the patient was transferred to a willing physician).
303. Veatch & Spicer, supra note 293, at 23.
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decision-maker" to evaluate whether a particular outcome is normatively
beneficial to the patient. 3 04 While it is generally accepted that physicians have no
duty to provide physiologically futile care, there is an ongoing controversy about
their obligation to provide patients with requested care that the physician believes
to be futile from a normative perspective.3 °5
Wanglie and Doe, among other cases in which health care providers were
compelled by courts to provide treatment to patients whom the health care
providers considered "hopeless," have caused a backlash within the medical
community against the dominance of patient autonomy in medical decision-
making. Many physicians and commentators believe that patient autonomy has
''gone too far" in demanding that physicians provide care that they consider
ineffective or "futile," arguing that the competing ethical value of "beneficence"
requires doctors to "do only what is medically helpful" and that "[i]ndividual
autonomy cannot be so inflated in importance as to destroy the principle of
,306beneficence." These commentators assert that the physician has the right to not
provide a medical treatment, even if technically effective, if the physician
concludes that the treatment will not benefit the patient.30 7
Discontent within the medical community about this trend has led many
states to pass statutes that permit physicians to refuse to provide "medically
ineffective" care or care that is "contrary to applicable health-care standards."
30 8
304. It.
305. See, e.g., James F. Drane & John L. Coulehan, The Concept of Futility: Patients Do Not
Have a Right To Demand Medicallv Useless Treatment, HEALTH PROGRESS, Dec. 1993, at 28, 30;
Stephen H. Miles, lnformed Demand for "Non-Beneficial" Medical Treatment, 325 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 512 (1991) (arguing that respect for patient autonomy does not obligate physicians to provide
treatment "in ways that are fruitless or inappropriate"); Robert M. Sade, Medical Care as a Right:
A Refitation, 28 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1288 (1971) (contending that viewing medical care as the right
of the patient is immoral). But see Allen S. Brett & Laurence B. McCullough, When Patients
Request Specific Interventions: Defining the Limits of the Physician's Obligation, 315 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1347, 1349 (1986) (advancing the position that if there is a "theoretical medical basis for a
patient's request for medical treatment, the patient's unique circumstances and stated reasons for
wanting the intervention should guide the final decision-making process"); Robert M. Veatch &
Carol Mason Spicer, Futile Care: Physicians Should Not Be Allowed To Refuse To Treat, HEALTH
PROGRESS, Dec. 28, 1993, at 22, 27 (distinguishing normative from physiological futility and
concluding that "the licensed professional who is given a monopoly over the control of life should
be expected to promise to use that technology when patients or surrogates ask for it").
306. Drane & Coulehan, supra note 305, at 30.
307. See, e.g., id. at 29.
308. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.060(f) (2005) ("A health care provider... may decline to comply
with an individual instruction or a health care decision that requires medically ineffective health
care or health care contrary to generally accepted health care standards applicable to the provider,
institution, or facility. In this subsection, 'medically ineffective health care' means health care that
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The Society of Critical Care Medicine, the American Thoracic Society, and the
American Medical Association have all issued policy statements affirming that
physicians have no obligation to provide treatment that in their best judgments
would be futile, offer no benefit to the patient, and only prolong the dying
process. 30 9 The American Thoracic Society adopted the Saikewicz court's
reference to the "ethical integrity of the medical profession" when it wrote:
"Forcing physicians to provide medical interventions that are clearly futile would
undermine the ethical integrity of the medical profession." 310 Thus, there has
been some effort within the medical community to re-assert the authority of
physicians to direct patient care even over the patient's objection.311
Criticizing the focus on patients' rights, Edmund Pellegrino observes: "In
according to reasonable medical judgment cannot cure the patient's illness, cannot diminish its
progressive course, and cannot effectively alleviate severe discomfort and distress."); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit 18-A, § 5-807 (2005) (stating that a health care provider or institution may refuse to
comply with health care instruction for reasons of conscience or if the instruction or decision
requires the provision of medically ineffective care or care contrary to applicable health-care
standards); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-611 (b)(1) (West 2005) ("[N]othing in this subtitle
may be construed to require a physician to prescribe or render medically ineffective treatment.");
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-09(3) (2005) ("This chapter does not require any physician or health
care provider to take any action contrary to reasonable medical standards."); Wvo. STAT. ANN. §
35-22-410(v) (2005) (establishing no liability for declining to comply with a health care decision
that is "contrary to the conscience or good faith medical judgment of the health care provider, or
the written policies of the institution").
309. American Thoracic Soc'y, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Therapy, 155
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 478, 481-83 (1991); Task Force on Ethics, Soc'y for Critical Care
Med., Consensus Report on the Ethics of Foregoing Life-Sustaining Treatments in the Critically Il,
18 CRITICAL CARE MED. 1435 (1990); Am. Med. Ass'n, E-2.035, Futile Care (Jan. 4, 2005),
http://www.ama-assn.org (search "E-2.035"; then follow "Professionalism: E-2.035 Futile Care").
310. American Thoracic Soc'y, supra note 309, at 477; see also Sade, supra note 305, at 1290-
91 ("Any doctor who.., is compelled by law to make any decision he would not otherwise have
made, is being forced to act against his own mind, which means forced to act against his own life.
He is also being forced to violate his most fundamental professional commitment, that of using his
own best judgment at all times for the greatest benefit of his patient.").
311. However, it is unclear whether these medical organizations acknowledge the difference
between treatment that is technically ineffective and treatment that is unlikely, in the physician's
view, to continue or improve the patient's quality of life. For example, the AMA does not appear to
advocate leaving to the physician whether a particular treatment will benefit a patient since it
defines resuscitative efforts to be "futile" if "they cannot be expected to restore cardiac or
respiratory function to the patient or to achieve the expressed goals of the informed patient."
Murphy, supra note 288, at 468 n.122 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). This quote seems to
suggest that the determination of whether a treatment will benefit a patient from a normative
standpoint should be made by the patient, and not the physician.
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the last twenty-five years autonomy has superseded beneficence as the first
principle of medical ethics. '31 2 This is the most radical reorientation in the long
history of the Hippocratic tradition. 31 3 Pellegrino argues for a balancing of the
patient's right to autonomy with the physician's right to autonomy. 31 4 Others
oppose the idea of physicians becoming "vending machines" dispensing
315treatment as ordered by their patients. Still others suggest that to demand that a
physician provide treatment that is "morally unpalatable . . .[is] likely to have a
corrosive effect upon the dedication and zeal with which [a physician] ministers
to patients.",316 In objecting to a mother's insistence that her severely handicapped
infant be aggressively treated, Gordon B. Avery suggests that, without some
authority over their actions, physicians cannot be held responsible for their
acts.
3 17
This Article does not suggest that health care providers sacrifice their ability
to provide professional advice to patients or that beneficence has no role in
medical decisions. Rather, it suggests that health care providers' professional
advice must be informed by the professional ethics generally accepted within
their respective professional communities and not by their own personal belief
systems. Both those who argue in favor of permitting physicians to withhold care
that they determine to be medically futile and those that posit that it is patients,
not physicians, who should decide whether care is beneficial focus their inquiry
on the benefit to the patient.31 8 "Personal medical benefit consists of such
advantages as restoration of health, cure, pain relief, comfort, alleviation of
suffering, and improved well-being or quality of life. The principle of
beneficence calls on physicians to help patients achieve those particular
goals .... 319 The disagreement among commentators revolves around who is in
312. Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Relationship of Autonomy and Integrity in Medical Ethics, 24
BULL. PAN AM. HEALTH ORG. 361, 361 (1990).
313. Id.
314. Pellegrino, supra note 40, at 51-52.
315. Paul A. Gomez, Promises and Pitfalls. An Analysis of the Shifting Constitutional Interests
Involved in the Context of Demanding a Right To Treatment in Health Care, 64 ALB. L. REV. 361,
391 (2000).
316. J. David Bleich, The Physician as a Conscientious Objector, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 245,
245 (2002).
317. Gordon B. Avery, Physicians' Refusal of Requested Treatment, Views from the Journal's
Editorial Board, 10 J. PERINATOLOGY 409 (1990).
318. Although Murphy argues in favor of physicians' rights to refuse to provide treatment that
they believe is medically futile, he confirms that one of the fundamental tenets of the Hippocratic
tradition is that "physicians must act solely for the benefit of their patients." Murphy, supra note
288, at 466.
319. Drane & Coulehan, supra note 305, at 32.
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the best position to make that determination-the patient or the physician.
In contrast, those who favor expanding refusal statutes and the rights of
health care professionals to decline to administer care based on their personal
beliefs base their reasoning on whether participation in the treatment will harm
the health care professional; that is, whether such treatment will offend the
health care professional's personal sense of morality. For example, Pellegrino
proposes a tripartite model of physician autonomy that recognizes the physician's
"autonomy as a person which gives moral status to the physician's personal
moral values and conscience. 32° While Pellegrino acknowledges that the
physician does not have the right to impose her will or conception of the good on
the patient, he concludes that even where a physician's adherence to her sense of
morality potentially will harm a patient, "the Catholic physician cannot violate
her conscience to provide a morally objectionable procedure or treatment.,
321
This Article challenges this approach, advocating instead an approach in which
the patient's interests prevail, even if ministering to these interests compromises
the physician's personal beliefs (but not the medical ethics to which she is
bound).
Traditional concepts of medical ethics instruct that medical decision-making
should be based on four core ethical principles: patient autonomy (patient self-
determination), non-maleficence (health care professional should do no harm),
beneficence (health care professional should do "good"), and justice (a concept
involving the fair distribution of scarce medical resources).322 Other than the
ethical principle of justice, which commentators generally agree should not be
considered in individual medical decisions, 323 these ethical principles focus on
the patient's needs. Refusal statutes, conversely, inappropriately permit the health
320. Pellegrino, supra note 40, at 51-52. The other components of physician autonomy are
"autonomy as a physician, which gives moral status to the physician's knowledge and obligation to
use it wisely and well"; and "autonomy as a member of a profession, of a moral community with
collective obligations to patients and society." Id.
321. Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Physician's Conscience, Conscience Clauses, and Religious
Belief A Catholic Perspective, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 221, 243 (2002). Pellegrino advises:
"Conscientious objection implies the physician's right not to participate in what she thinks morally
wrong, even if the patient demands it." Id. at 242. To his credit, he suggests that religious
physicians who refuse to provide certain types of care should notify their patients in advance of
their objections. However, while he acknowledges that such advance notification may not be
possible in emergencies or in remote locations, he nevertheless concludes that the religious
physician should not provide the objectionable treatment. Id. at 243.
322. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 37-40 (4th
ed. 1994).
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care professional to place her personal moral, religious, or political judgment
ahead of her patients' health interests.
324
IV. PROPOSED COMPROMISES: BALANCING THE ACCESS RIGHTS OF PATIENTS
AGAINST THE PERSONAL BELIEFS OF HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS
Unlike professional ethics that are based on a consensus of values generally
accepted by the medical professional community, personal morals are usually
viewed to derive from religion.3 25 The right to religious freedom is firmly
entrenched in the United States and has enjoyed protection throughout American
history. However, since there is no corresponding right to health care in the
United States, it is not surprising that the rights of religious health care
professionals have taken priority over the access needs of patients. According to
commentator Katherine White, refusal clauses are neither constitutionally
mandated by the Free Exercise Clause, nor constitutionally forbidden by the
Establishment Clause; as a result, they remain in political play.
326
The First Amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... Some
religious health care providers argue that requiring them to provide access to
health services to which they have religion-based objections burdens their rights
to exercise their religion freely. 328 Thus, for example, they argue that their free
exercise rights are abridged by state laws requiring religious hospitals to provide
their employees with medical insurance that covers contraception or mandating
that religious hospitals dispense emergency contraception to rape victims.
At least two commentators have suggested reasons why this argument
cannot be supported. In analyzing the somewhat muddled law concerning the
Free Exercise Clause, both Brietta Clark and Katherine White conclude that
324. See Adam Sonfield, Rights vs. Responsibilities: Professional Standards and Provider
Refiusals, GUTTMACHER REP., Aug. 2005, at 7, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/08/
3/gr080307.pdf.
325. This is not to say that an atheist cannot have personal morals that are as firmly entrenched
as that of religious believers.
326. White, supra note 149, at 1729-30.
327. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment has been interpreted to apply to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303 (1940). The free exercise of religion is also protected by statute, see, e.g., Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000), which provides in relevant part that it
is an unlawful employment practice to "discharge ... or otherwise ... discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment,
because of... religion."
328. See Clark, supra note 10, at 649-65; White, supra note 149, at 1728.
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under the more recent, less stringent test established by Employment Division v.
Smith,329 as well as under the stricter test developed in Sherbert v. Verner330 and
required under various state "Religious Freedom Restoration Acts" (RFRAs), 331
religious health care providers would be unlikely to prevail. In Smith, the
appellants were arrested under an Oregon law criminalizing possession of a
controlled substance when they were caught using peyote. At least one of the
appellants argued that his use of peyote was part of his religious practice and
therefore protected by the Free Exercise Clause.332 In the majority opinion,
Justice Scalia distinguished between absolute protection for religious belief and
qualified protection for religious conduct,3 33 and concluded that, since the Oregon
criminal law was a neutral law of general applicability that did not target
religion,334 its application to the appellant was not prohibited by the Free
Exercise Clause.3 35 According to the Court, the stricter Sherbert test applies only
where a law is non-neutral or not of general applicability (for example, an
unemployment compensation law that requires consideration of the individual
circumstances of the employee in deciding whether she deserves compensation)
or where a law implicates other constitutional rights.33 6
Like the Court in Smith, the Court in Sherbert distinguished governmental
regulation of religious beliefs, which is impermissible, from governmental
regulation of "certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles ..."
which is permissible where the actions regulated "pose ... some substantial
threat to public safety, peace or order. 3 37 However, because it found that the
appellant's conduct in refusing to work on her Sabbath Day due to her Seventh
Day Adventist beliefs did not pose such a threat, the Court required the state to
329. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
330. 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
331. Congress reacted to the Smith decision by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). RFRA re-established the "compelling interest" test even as
applied to rules of general applicability, but was found to be unconstitutional as applied to states.
Boerne, 521 U.S. 507. However, RFRA may be constitutionally applied to the federal government.
See, e.g., Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006).
After Boerne, many states enacted their own versions of RFRA. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
761.03 (West 2005) (re-establishing the "compelling interest" test abrogated in Smith for laws in
Florida).
332. Smith, 494 U.S. at 897.
333. Id. at 877-79.
334. Id. at 878-82.
335. Id. at 890.
336. Id. at 881-82.
337. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
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justify its denial of unemployment compensation to the appellant with a
"compelling state interest., 338 The Court found that the mere possibility that
"unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work
might... dilute the unemployment compensation fund" 3 9 was not substantiated
in the record and did not constitute such a compelling interest. Furthermore, the
Court concluded that even if such a possibility did "threaten to dilute the fund
and disrupt the scheduling of work, it would plainly be incumbent upon the
appellees to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat
such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights."
340
Thus, while Smith applies a rational basis test to generally-applicable neutral
state laws that do not target religion, Sherbert and various state RFRAs apply a
compelling interest test to state laws that potentially impair the free exercise of
religion. Whether the rational basis test or the compelling interest is applied,
Clark and White contend that, because of the strong policy arguments in favor of
state laws requiring health care providers to offer reproductive services, states
should be able to demonstrate that they have compelling interests that justify
their laws.3 4' Clark observes:
Thus, in the religious hospital conflict [i.e. as in Sherbert], even if courts do
apply... [the compelling interest test], an exemption would probably still be
denied in light of the countervailing government interests to ensure access to
medically necessary care and to help counter gender discrimination in the
health care system.
34 2
Regarding individual health care professionals, the state may also have a
compelling interest in assuring that these professionals practice in a competent
manner. 343
While the Free Exercise Clause may not protect the rights of religious
providers to refuse to provide health services that the government considers
necessary to protect public health, the Establishment Clause does not appear to
prohibit the adoption of refusal clauses. The Establishment Clause "sets a
maximum amount of assistance" that the government may offer religious
entities. 344 One might also argue that in adopting refusal laws that exempt
338. Id.
339. Id. at 407.
340. Id.
341. Clark, supra note 10, at 664; White, supra note 149, at 1728.
342. Clark, supra note 10, at 664.
343. See, e.g., Noesen v. Wis. Dep't of Reg. & Licensing Pharm. Examining Bd., No. 05CV212,
slip op. at 15-16 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Feb. 3, 2006).
344. White, supra note 149, at 1729.
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religious providers from, for example, general laws requiring the dispensing of
emergency contraception for rape victims, states are unconstitutionally endorsing
the practice of religion. However, since most refusal clauses exempt objectors
who base their position on either religious or moral convictions, it is likely these
clauses would survive a challenge based on the Establishment Clause. 345 Even if
the clauses exempted religious providers only, the trend among courts is to
permit broad governmental accommodation of religion 346 short of actual
endorsement of a particular religion.347
Still, an Establishment Clause challenge might be raised successfully if a
refusal clause permits only members of one religious sect to assert their religious-
based refusals; conversely, a clause that exempts all religious providers might be
viewed as relieving from religious objectors burdens that otherwise would
interfere with their free exercise of religion. In Children's Healthcare Is a Legal
Duty, Inc. v. Min de Parle,348 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
provision in the Medicare Act that exempted sanitaria operated by "Religious
Non-Medical Health Care Institutions" from various medical standards that were
required from other institutions receiving reimbursement under the Act does not
violate the Establishment Clause. 349 Although a lower court had held that the
original version of the provision was unconstitutional because it specifically
exempted only sanitaria operated by "Christian Science" practitioners ,350
Congress amended the law to refer to religious providers in general, causing the
Court of Appeals to conclude that the provision was "by its terms sect-
neutral. 351 Moreover, the court determined that the exemption "possessed a
secular legislative purpose because it removes a special burden imposed by the
Medicare and Medicaid Acts upon persons who hold religious objections to
345. Id.
346. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 601
n.51 (1989) (noting that government efforts to accommodate religion are permissible under the
Establishment Clause when they remove burdens on free exercise of religion).
347. The Allegheny court observed: "Whatever else the Establishment Clause may mean (and
we have held it to mean no official preference even for religion over nonreligion), it certainly
means at the very least that government may not demonstrate a preference for one particular sect or
creed ... " Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 605 (citation omitted).
348. 212 F.3d 1084 (8th Cir. 2000).
349. Id. at 1100.
350. Children's Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Vladeck, 938 F. Supp. 1466, 1478-80 (D.
Minn. 1996).
351. Min de Parle, 212 F.3d at 1090. As the dissent points out, this is a curious conclusion since
the legislative history of the provision demonstrates that the "sole impetus for the present law was
the alleged plight of Christian Scientists." Id. at 1102.
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medical care. 352 Thus, even if a refusal statute limits itself to religious, as
opposed to moral, objectors, proponents might successfully argue that that such
statutes are merely "relieving a burden" from religious health care providers so
that they would be able to freely exercise their religious beliefs.353
Because refusal clauses seem to lie in a legally gray area, they have been
subject to an abundance of political play in the past thirty years. The increasing
political influence of religious groups in America during this period has resulted
in an increase and broadening of religion-based refusal clauses passed by state
legislatures and Congress. Meanwhile, no corresponding lobbying group has
been effective in passing legislation to protect patient access to health care.
In fact, with the development of large managed care plans and the increase
in the number of hospital mergers, patients' freedom to choose their health care
providers has decreased. Since many managed care plans and merged hospitals
involve religiously affiliated institutions, the availability of certain types of
medical procedures, especially in the areas of emergency contraception, abortion,
sterilization, and assisted reproduction, has decreased. 354 Catholic hospitals have
been one of the fastest growing segments of health care. Susan Fogel and
Lourdes Rivera report that in 1999, Catholic systems reported a 25.1% increase
in the number of Catholic-owned acute care hospitals and a 22.8% increase in
staffed beds, while the number of non-Catholic hospitals during the same time
period decreased.355 Additionally, Fogel and Rivera report that by 2002 seven of
the top ten hospitals in the United States were Catholic. Further, they note that by
2004, five of the ten largest health care systems in the United States were
Catholic; Catholic institutions controlled the largest single group of non-profit
hospitals in the United States; the Ascension Health System was the largest non-
profit system with net patient revenues of over $7.2 billion; and eighteen percent
of all hospitals and twenty percent of all hospital beds in the United States were
controlled by Catholic systems.356 They also report that there were 171 mergers
or acquisitions of secular hospitals by Catholic health systems between 1990 and
2001. In addition to the growing influence of religious hospitals as the result of
352. Id. at 1093.
353. Notwithstanding the courts' general sympathy to governmental accommodations of
religion, White suggests that where the government provides funding to health care institutions, but
allows religious institutions to modify the package of services they provide, an Establishment
Clause challenge might be successful. White, supra note 149, at 1732.
354. See Fogel & Rivera, Saving Roe is Not Enough, supra note 38, at 729-32.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. In addition to formal mergers, many religious hospitals and long-term care facilities
develop other types of corporate relationships, including the creation of for-profit subsidiaries, joint
ventures, acquisitions or other contractual affiliations with for-profit hospital systems or mergers
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mergers, their influence is spreading as the result of what William Bassett calls
the "corporate transformation of hospitals and acute care medical facilities under
the impetus of managed care imperatives. 358 He points out that patients are often
not in the position to choose their health insurers, let alone their own health
providers since, increasingly, those choices are being made by their employers or
unions359 or, if they are poor, by the government.
360
Catholic hospitals are governed by the Ethical and Religious Directives for
Health Care Services, promulgated by the United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops. 36' These directives prohibit virtually all reproductive health services,
including contraception other than "natural family planning," most infertility
treatments, sterilizations, and abortion.362 There are no exceptions for rape,
incest, or to protect the life or health of the pregnant woman.363 The directives
also prohibit harvesting the eggs of cancer victims for later implantation and
permit Catholic hospitals to refuse to withdraw artificial nutrition in accordance
with a terminally ill patient's wishes.364 The United States Catholic Conference
Board opposes counseling HIV-infected patients regarding the use of condoms to
prevent the spread of HIV.365 Some or all of these positions are taken by health
facilities owned by other religious denominations, for example, Seventh-Day
Adventists, the Southern Baptist, and American Baptist hospitals.366 Thus, many
patients may be deprived of medically indicated care simply because the hospital
that serves their geographic area is owned by a religious institution.
Patient access to care is particularly affected in rural areas where there may
be few providers who offer the care required. For example, in 2000, eighty-seven
involving public and community hospitals. Unless the religious hospital is completely absorbed by
a for-profit system, the religious hospitals' moral directives often apply to these ventures. See
Bassett, supra note 38.
358. Bassett, supra note 38 at 457.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 517-18. The Federal Medicaid statute requires that recipients have access to family
planning. However, the Balanced Budget Act, enacted in 1997, permits religious hospitals and
Medicaid and Medicare managed care plans to refuse to provide reproductive health services to
which they object on moral grounds. If they do so object, the state is charged with providing
information to recipients about where such service is available. Id.
361. Fogel & Rivera, Saving Roe is Not Enough, supra note 38, at 732.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 737.
365. Bassett, supra note 38, at 511-12. However, while the Board does not promote the use of
condoms, it does permit the provision of accurate information about prophylactic devices proposed
by some medical experts as ways to reduce the transmission of HIV. Id.
366. Id. at 504-07.
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percent of counties in the United States had no abortion provider. One third of
American women lived in these counties, which means that they had to travel to
other counties or other states to obtain this constitutionally protected service. Of
women obtaining abortions in 2000, twenty-five percent traveled at least fifty
miles, and eight percent traveled more than one hundred miles.367 As of February
2006, fourteen out of sixty-seven Pennsylvania counties did not have hospital
emergency rooms with policies requiring the dispensing of emergency
contraception on-site."'
One of the problems with the various new corporate forms assumed by
religious hospitals is that it is often difficult for patients to know in advance
which hospitals have policies restricting access to certain procedures. In order to
maintain federal funding, many religious hospitals have expanded their boards of
directors to add members of the public and have opened their hiring policies
beyond members of their particular religious sect. 369 With the decline of
charitable immunity protections, they have also begun to restructure to protect
their assets from suit.370 The result of this "re-incorporation movement,"
according to Bassett, is to
separat[e] hospital facilities as independent corporations from their sponsoring
religious bodies [to] dampen[] religious symbolism and religious control ...
[and to hide] the religious ministry to the sick behind bland neutral facades. For
prospective hospital patients and insurance purchasers today it is not always
easy to distinguish a religious hospital from another rivate, community, or in
many cases, commercial health care franchises[sic].
37 1
This point was confirmed by a national survey in 2000 that found that almost half
of the women questioned believed that if they were admitted to a Catholic
hospital, they would be able to get services that were contrary to Catholic
teachings.372
The Hyde-Weldon Amendment, as well as the most recently enacted state
refusal statutes, allow health care providers not only to refuse to provide certain
types of care, but also to refuse even to inform patients of the availability of
367. GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE CENTER, STATE FACTS ABOUT ABORTION: PENNSYLVANIA 2
(2006), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/sfaa/pdf/pennsylvania.pdf
368. ACLU of Penn., PA Hospital List (Feb. 8, 2006), http://www.aclupa.org/education/
clarabellduvallreproductiv/emergencycontraceptionproj/ (follow "Do the hospitals in my county
provide EC to rape victims?" hyperlink; then follow "Counties A-E" hyperlink).
369. Bassett, supra note 38, at 545.
370. Id. at 549.
371. Id. at 551-52.
372. Fogel & Rivera, Saving Roe is Not Enough, supra note 38, at 740.
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certain types of care, thus further restricting patients' rights to receive medically
indicated care. There has been some movement by states to require managed care
organizations and insurance companies to inform their members of any
restrictions on the covered services.373 For example, California enacted the
Kuehl-Thomson Health Benefits Act of 1999,374 which requires a paragraph to be
inserted in twelve-point boldface type and posted in a prominent location on the
websites of health plans, disability plans, and Medi-Cal plans that specifically
states which services might not be covered. However, until all states follow
California's lead, patients will be disadvantaged by lack of information in their
choice of providers. Medicaid recipients outside of California who are
mandatorily enrolled in managed care plans that refuse to provide certain
services are often not given information about how to obtain the services that
their health care provider refuses to provide. Moreover, as Fogel and Rivera point
out, even if these patients "have the right to go out-of-plan to obtain these
services ... that assumes that there are out-of-plan geographically-accessible
services and that the women know how to access them.
3 75
Several authors have suggested that, in view of these changes in the health
care system, the prerogative of religious institutions to adhere to their religious
beliefs should no longer be viewed as absolute, but instead should be balanced
against the rights of patients to have access to health care. 376 Among the so-called
compromise tactics suggested to achieve the balance between patients' rights to
access and health care professionals' rights to refuse treatment are: (1) full
disclosure so that patients know, before they sign up for a managed care plan or
enter a hospital, whether the health care provider objects to providing particular
types of care; 37 7 (2) open and direct access laws that allow patients whose
373. Id. at 741; see also Bassett, supra note 38, at 579 (reporting that eleven states require that
subscribers be notified of any restrictions on services provided by their plans).
374. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1363.02 (West 2006); see also, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
48.43.065(2)(b) (West 2006) (requiring notification of the service the carrier refuses to cover and
written information about where such services may be obtained).
375. Fogel & Rivera, Saving Roe is Not Enough, supra note 38, at 742.
376. See Bassett, supra note 38; Clark, supra note 10, at 692.
377. White, supra note 149, at 1742-43; see also Patient Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. No.
101-508, § 4206, 104 Stat. 1388-44 (1990) (codified as amended in relevant part at 42 U.S.C.
1395cc(f) (2000)) (requiring hospitals to inform patients at the time of admission of "an
individual's rights under State law (whether statutory or as recognized by the courts of the State) to
make decisions concerning such medical care, including the right to accept or refuse medical or
surgical treatment and the right to formulate advance directives" and of "the written policies of the
provider or organization respecting the implementation of such rights ..."); In re Requena, 517
A.2d 869, 870 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (holding that the family of a patient seeking
withdrawal of artificial nutrition should have received advance notification of the nursing home's
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managed care providers refuse to provide certain types of care to seek care
directly from other providers whose reimbursement will be paid by the managed
care plan; 31 (3) referrals to other qualified providers;379 (4) merger agreements
that provide for care that is objected to by the religious partner to be provided by
the secular partner; 380 (5) classification of hospitals as either secular and truly
sectarian institutions, with laws permitting only the latter to refuse to provide
certain services; 38 1 (6) harsher standards that allow refusal to treat only on the
basis of "true conscientious objection"; 382 and (7) suggestions that objectors
consider shifting specialties or selecting a different occupation.3 83
Each of these proposed compromises raises problems of its own. Full
disclosure and open access will only work under limited conditions. The recipient
must be sufficiently educated to understand the materials provided by the
managed care plan and sufficiently sophisticated to understand the potential
ramifications of her choice of health plans on her future health care; there must
be alternative health plans available; and they must be convenient. Under-
educated (often poor) clients may not comprehend the necessary information. In
fact, many educated health care consumers have found themselves bewildered in
trying to choose among various health plans, considering the range of services
addressed in their brochures. Also, managed care plans have little incentive to
provide information about providers outside of their networks, since providing
such information reduces a managed care plan's control over its members' health
care. 384 Moreover, it can be difficult for an individual to anticipate at the time she
joins a health plan exactly what services she may need in the future. For example,
a woman might enroll in a health plan anticipating that she will require prenatal
policy against such withdrawal).
378. White, supra note 149, at 1745.
379. Fogel & Rivera, Saving Roe is Not Enough, supra note 38, at 729; Law, supra note 38, at
290.
380. Fogel & Rivera, Saving Roe is Not Enough, supra note 38, at 747 (suggesting that mergers
are one of several "creative solutions to preserve some range of access to otherwise prohibited
services," but noting that "the solutions are limited" and produce results with which "not everyone
is always happy"), White, supra note 149, at 1736-37.
381. ACLU REPROD. FREIDOM PROJECT, supra note 8.
382. Law, supra note 38, at 303.
383. Karen E. Adams, Moral Diversity Among Physicians and Conscientious Refusal of Care in
the Provision of Abortion Services, 58 J. AM. MED. WOMEN'S ASS'N 223 (2003), available at
http://www.jamwa.org/index.cfm?objectid=E5027CO2-D567-OB25-5358598DOC27E4AB; Jeffrey
Blustein & Alan R. Fleischman, The Pro-Lift Maternal-Fetal Medicine Physician, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 26: John M. Thorp, Jr. et al., Integrit,, Abortion and the Pro-Life
Perinatologist, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 27.
384. White, supra note 149, at 1746.
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coverage, not realizing at the time that she will want a tubal ligation at the time
of her third caesarian section. In addition, poor patients may not have the cars,
phones, or child care necessary to search for a willing provider.
385
Encouraging referrals to other qualified providers is a helpful alternative
only in non-emergency situations and only if other qualified providers are
available and convenient. A few statutes, as well as some codes of ethics, require
that patients be transferred to other willing providers, at least in the context of
end-of-life care.3 86 However, in addition to the possibility that there may be no
willing provider available, especially in rural areas (and even in urban areas
when the treatment is a controversial one), this option overlooks some
possibilities. As a threshold matter, a patient may be unwilling to accept a new
provider.387 Even more notably, a health care professional may decide that her
personal beliefs are so inflexible that she cannot condone participating in the
requested treatment even if her participation is limited to informing or referring
the patient to another provider (as in the Noesen case). 388 Likewise, Pellegrino
states that "[r]espect for the patient's autonomy does not include referral to a
physician who will carry out the procedure if that procedure involves an act the
physician deems intrinsically and seriously wrong. For a conscientious physician,
this would be an inadmissible degree of formal cooperation. 3 89 Bassett addresses
a number of "creative accommodations" that have been advocated, including
referrals, "contracting out" services to another provider, creation of separate
facilities, and financing and sharing resources with out-patient clinics.
390
However, he also concludes that these options "are not a principled solution,
391
in that they constitute "moral cooperation" in care that the health care
professional finds objectionable.39 a Furthermore, he cites examples from
Germany where mandated referral by organizations with moral objections "was
so profoundly humiliating to women petitioning [for referral] that it set off
385. Id. at 1746.
386. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:6(III) (2005); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5409
(2005); see also Snyder & Leffler, supra note 29, at 562 (stating that physicians should consider
transferring the care of the patient to a willing provider).
387. See In re Requena, 517 A.2d 869 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
388. Disciplinary Proceeding Against Neil T. Noesen, 01 P.H.M. 080 (Wis. Pharm. Examining
Bd. Feb. 28, 2005) (proposed final decision & order), affd, Noesen v. Wis. Dep't of Reg. &
Licensing Pharm. Examining Bd., No. 05CV212 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Feb. 3, 2006).
389. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Commentary: Value Neutrality, Moral Integrity, and the Physician,
28 J. L. MED & ETHICS 78, 79 (2000).
390. Bassett, supra note 38, at 526.
391. Id. at 527.
392. Id. at 529.
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strident opposition in Germany that continues until today."
393
The fourth proposal, involving merger agreements between religious and
non-religious health care institutions, can work only if the religious partner
agrees that the secular partner may provide the objectionable services. Like
referral, this option constitutes a type of "creative accommodation" that would be
considered "moral cooperation." However, White cites several instances in which
these types of arrangements seemed to work. For example, Deaconness Hospital
in Montana deeded real estate property to Planned Parenthood prior to merging
with a Catholic-affiliated hospital.3 94 White also discusses arrangements in which
Catholic facilities have created independent physician-sponsored clinics to
provide reproductive services, either inside Catholic facilities (but with a separate
entrance) or at separate nearby facilities. 395 Yet, White also notes that as Catholic
hospital involvement in mergers has increased, the church hierarchy has become
more involved in the negotiations and has sought to enforce the directives more
strictly, thus terminating many consolidation negotiations between Catholic and
non-Catholic health care entities. In 1996-1997, five of nine consolidation
negotiations between Catholics and non-Catholic health care entities were
terminated due to Catholic doctrinal issues.396
Another more useful suggestion for addressing the problems proposed by the
conflict between health care institutions' religious tenets and the medical needs
of patients has been proposed by the American Civil Liberties Union
Reproductive Rights Project. The ACLU suggests that refusal clauses should be
analyzed using the following principles: (1) the more the burdens of refusal fall
on people who do not share the beliefs that motivate the refusal, the less
acceptable any claimed right to refuse; and (2) the more public and secular the
setting, the less acceptable an institution's claimed right to refuse.39 7
Thus, religiously affiliated hospitals that treat the public would not be
permitted to refuse, on the basis of their religious beliefs, to dispense emergency
contraception, perform abortions and sterilizations, withdraw life support, etc. On
393. Id. at 535.
394. White, supra note 149, at 1736.
395. Id. at 1736-37.
396. Id. at 1738. White notes that "church leaders have sought to enforce the Catholic Ethical
and Religious Directives more stringently, preventing Catholic facilities from providing family
planning, sterilization, or emergency contraception." Id. Catholic facilities are also discouraged
from associating with institutions that provide abortions. U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS,
ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES, FOURTH EDITION, at
Directive 45 (4th ed. 2001), available at http://www.usccb.org/bishops/directives.shtml#partfour
("Catholic health care institutions need to be concerned about the danger of scandal in any
association with abortion providers.").
397. ACLU REPROD. FREEDOM PROJECT, supra note 8, at 6.
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the other hand, truly sectarian institutions that open their doors only to people
who share their beliefs would be permitted to refuse to provide insurance
coverage for contraception to their employees. Yet, this proposal fails to address
situations in which a religiously affiliated hospital is the only hospital in the
region, where a Medicaid recipient is involuntarily assigned to a religious
managed care plan, or where, due to corporate restructuring, the religious nature
of the hospital is obscured.
In a similar vein, William Bassett proposes that religious health care
institutions should not be permitted to refuse to provide certain types of care
unless they make full disclosure to patients and patients are able to choose freely
other available providers:
To remain free to curtail otherwise legally-permissible medical procedures the
hospitals must accentuate their religious identity in unmistakable terms so that
patients know what their choices are, avoid monopolization of general health
services in particular communities, and restrain the semblance of competitive
commercialization. Patients must know in advance what services are or are not
available from contract health care providers and practically and feasibly be
able to act on those choices.
398
Bassett further suggests that, notwithstanding the line of cases that protect
the rights of religious health care institutions to freely exercise their religious
beliefs, the state should be permitted to abridge such rights in four cases: (1)
when children and handicapped victims require treatment for rape or incest; (2)
when adult female victims of sexual crimes require emergency treatment; (3) in
the provision of blood transfusions, organ transplants, or medically routinized
and standard care procedures, such as dialysis, or to save or prolong the life of
mentally incompetent adults entrusted to the care of the hospital; and (4) in
providing care to sexually active AIDS patients.399 Since Bassett himself
recognizes a generalized inability, due to various social forces, of individuals to
choose their health care providers, it is not clear why he would limit the State's
ability to override the religious rights of health care institutions only to these
limited instances. Following his line of reasoning, whenever individuals'
freedom to choose their health care providers is limited, these providers should
be required to offer the requested and medically indicated care.
Also problematic is the fact that the solutions proposed by both the ACLU
and Bassett pertain to institutional health care providers only. Neither challenges
the right of individual health care professionals to assert their religious or moral
objections to patient care. In fact, the ACLU lauds the Church Amendment as a
398. Bassett, supra note 38, at 565.
399. Id. at 572-73.
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useful model for protecting the rights of individual health care professionals to
refuse to participate in medically indicated treatments based on their personal
moral or religious beliefs, 40° provided that the refusing health care professional
furnishes the patient with accurate and complete information, refers the patient to
another provider, and provides the "objectionable" medical care in emergency
situations. 40 1 None of the proposed compromises suggest that individuals who
choose to become health care professionals, who obtain monopolistic licenses
awarded by the state, and who assume a fiduciary duty to "put their patients'
interests first" should be precluded from imposing their personal religious or
moral beliefs on their patients.
While accepting the general principle that individual health care
professionals have the right to refuse to participate in certain treatments, at least
one author has suggested that refusals should not be honored without challenge.
Raising the possibility that many refusal clauses may relieve health care
professionals from participating in abortions when in reality they hold no strong
religious convictions but merely want to avoid a controversial issue, Sylvia Law
suggests that the reasons for the health care professional's refusal should be
evaluated.40 2 Like those who conscientiously object to military service,
physicians should be excused from participating in abortions only if they have
"true conscientious objections. 40 3 Presumably, this would require health care
professionals to "make their case" before some sort of professional or
institutional review board.
This idea is explored further in an article by William Nelson and Cedric
Dark,40 4 suggesting that "claims of conscience" should be first brought to a health
care professional's immediate supervisor to evaluate such claims for validity.
Claims that appear to be valid would then be passed on to an organizational
review board composed of members from various ethnic, religious, and academic
settings. The mission of this board would be to evaluate the genuineness of the
claim based on the following factors: (1) whether the objection fits within "a
coherent system of moral, religious, cultural or philosophical beliefs; (2) whether
the belief reflects "a consistently and diligently held core value of the petitioner";
(3) whether the belief is such "a key component of the petitioner's internal
400. ACLU REPROD. FREEDOM PROJECT, supra note 8, at 10; see also Bassett, supra note 38, at
456 ("While the rights of conscience of each and every health care professional must be securely
safeguarded at law, institutional ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the individual patient.").
401. Fogel & Rivera, Saving Roe is Not Enough, supra note 38, at 729.
402. Law, supra note 38, at 303.
403. Id.; see also Conscientious Objectors, 32 C.F.R. §§ 75.3-5 (2006) (requiring conscientious
objectors to demonstrate a "firm, fixed and sincere" belief).
404. William A. Nelson & Cedric K. Dark, Evaluating Claims of Conscience, HEALTIICARE
EXECUTIVE, Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 54.
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framework that violation of that belief would cause significant harm to him or
her"; and (4) whether it would be "inconsistent with the petitioner's core values
to participate in the procedure or treatment., 40 5 If the claim is found to be valid,
some sort of reasonable accommodation should be made by the institution that
does not create undue hardship for the organization, its employees, or the patient.
If the claim is found not to be valid, the petitioner should be reassigned or
possibly terminated, in which case the petitioner would retain the right to file an
appeal, including possibly an external one.406
Whether any health care settings other than those affiliated with universities
would have the knowledge, interest, and resources to undertake the establishment
of such boards is questionable. Moreover, it is likely that these health care
institutional boards, in an attempt to avoid litigation, would find in favor of the
health care professionals in the majority of cases that would come before them.
Nevertheless, establishing a formal procedure that would require health care
professionals to articulate and defend their objections would filter out health care
professionals whose objections do not arise from their "core values." Of course,
this procedure would apply only to health care professionals working in an
institutional setting, and not to health care practitioners in private practice. The
only potential existing mechanisms for reviewing the justification for provider
refusals among private practitioners are their respective professional boards.
However, these boards are often under-staffed, under-funded, and without the
requisite expertise; consequently, their willingness and ability to undertake such
a task is dubious. Furthermore, this type of examination, at least in public
hospitals and state licensing boards, may raise questions under the Free Exercise
Clause because it would require a neutral body to inquire into the "centrality" of
the refusal to the individual's core beliefs. This mode of inquiry was rejected by
the Supreme Court, insofar as it would be exercised by courts since it "would
enmesh judges in an impermissible inquiry into the centrality of particular beliefs
or practices to a faith., 40 7 Most importantly, it is arguable that the depth of a
health care professional's personal beliefs is irrelevant in light of her undertaking
the responsibility to put the patient's best interest ahead of her own interests.
Finally, several commentators have suggested that if a physician cannot
participate in a medical procedure due to her personal moral or religious beliefs,
she should consider practicing in an area of medicine in which the patient's
access to care would not be compromised. 40 8 However, since changing medical
405. Id. at 54.
406. Id. at 55.
407. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-77 (1990).
408. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 383, at 225-26 (matemal-fetal medicine); Blustein &
Fleischman, supra note 383, at 26 (same); Thorp et al., supra note 383, at 28 (same).
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technology and changing social mores may implicate a clinician's moral and
religious beliefs in ways that cannot be foreseen at the outset of her professional
training, this suggestion is impractical. For example, an internist training today
might not consider whether she has moral objections to the application of
technologies and treatments derived from stem cell research simply because the
technology has not yet been developed.
A key assumption in most of these proposals is that individual, as opposed to
institutional, health care providers generally have a right, based on their religious
beliefs or personal moral codes, to refuse to provide medically indicated health
care to their patients. This Article contests this assumption on the grounds that
the primary goal of health care professionals should be to promote their patients'
health, not to advance their own personal moral judgments.
V. DISTINGUISHING PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND THE PERSONAL BELIEFS OF
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
In cases involving reproductive issues, health care professionals have tended
to assert religious or moral objections, whereas they have generally asserted
professional ethical objections, rather than religious objections, in cases
involving end-of-life issues. While courts often have refused to accept health care
professionals' personal interpretations of their professional ethical
responsibilities, they generally attribute significant weight to commonly accepted
professional ethics. Thus, in upholding patients' legal rights to refuse medical
treatment, courts have relied upon the medical community's generally accepted
ethical principle that patients have the right to refuse unwanted medical care. The
ethical principle that favors patient autonomy has also manifested itself in many
of the cases that address issues of medical futility, "trumping" physicians'
objections based on their personal value judgments regarding what constitutes
"quality of life. 4 09
409. These cases generally involve the provision of care that has the desired physiological
effect, but where there is a dispute between caregivers and the patient's surrogate about the net
benefit of the treatment to the patient's quality of life. Conversely, several physicians'
organizations have issued statements and several states have passed statutes that state that
physicians are not required to provide "ineffective" treatment. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §
13.52.060(f) (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 18-A, § 5-807 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GFN.
§ 5-61 l(b)(l) (West 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-09(3) (2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-
410(v) (2005); American Thoracic Soc'y, Withholding and Withdrawing Lift-Sustaining Therapy,
155 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 478, 481-83 (1991); Task Force on Ethics, Soc'y for Critical Care
Med., Consensus Report on the Ethics of Foregoing Life-Sustaining Treatments in the Critically Ill,
18 CRITICAL CARE MED. 1435 (1990); Am. Med. Ass'n, E-2.035, Futile Care (Jan. 4, 2005),
http://www.ama-assn.org (search "E-2.035"; then follow "Professionalism: E-2.035 Futile Care").
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Professions establish their own acceptable standards of competence, as well
as unique professional ethics. General medical malpractice standards require
physicians to practice in accordance with "the degree of skill and care ordinarily
possessed by a reasonable and prudent physician in the same medical specialty
acting under the same or similar circumstances. 41 0 Departing from this standard
may result in liability or professional disciplinary actions. The standard of care is
established through expert testimony on the customary practice within a
particular specialty, reference to medical literature, and guidelines established by
institutions, accrediting agencies, and professional associations. Thus, a
physician or other health care professional who refuses to provide medically
indicated treatment to a patient because the health care professional has
determined that providing the treatment would violate her religious beliefs is
likely to be found to have committed professional malpractice; most refusal
411statutes, however, wrongly provide immunity for this type of malpractice.
The prevailing ethical norms of professionals are codified in their codes of
professional ethics. These are standards that are collectively defined and
accepted.412 An individual physician, nurse, or pharmacist may have her own
personal beliefs and values derived from her religion, culture, family, and
community. However, these are personal beliefs, as opposed to professional
standards. Clearly, professional ethics have a place in professional decision-
making, since they are at the core of every profession. The question is what
place, if any, an individual health care provider's personal moral and religious
beliefs should have in medical decision-making.
"Professional integrity" in medicine, according to Miller and Brody,
"represents what it means normatively to be a physician; it encompasses the
values, norms and virtues that are distinctive and characteristic of physicians. 413
410. Levine, supra note 288, at 101.
411. See, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/4 (West 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5(2)
(West 2005); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 197.032 (West 2005).
412. Various medical professional codes of ethics have carved out exceptions from their general
requirements that the primary duty of the professional is to the patient to permit the professional to
follow her own personal beliefs, especially regarding reproductive services. For example, the
American College of Physicians' (ACP) Ethics Manual, states: "The ethical duty to disclose
relevant information about human reproduction to the patient may conflict with the physician's
personal moral standards on abortion, sterilization, contraception, or other reproductive services. A
physician who objects to these services is not obligated to recommend, perform, or prescribe
them." Snyder & Leffler, supra note 29, at 564. Notably, the Ethics Manual does not carve out a
similar exception regarding any other types of care. See id. Where ethics codes do carve out these
exceptions, they fail to reconcile the contradiction inherent in advancing the best interests of the
patient and, at the same time, protecting the personal interests of the health care provider.
413. Franklin G. Miller & Howard Brody, Professional Integrity and Physician-Assisted Death,
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Unlike "personal integrity" which relates to "the full identity of persons which
characterizes their lives as a whole," professional integrity relates to the "moral
identity of those who occupy a distinctive social role., 41 4 "While there remains
some free scope for individuality in the practice of medicine, and a good
physician may have a unique personal style, professional identity generally
constrains individual expression in a way that personal identity does not. 41 5
Thus, an athletic orthopedic surgeon may, due to his personal values, believe
that a patient should undergo repair of the tendon in his knee so that the patient
can continue skiing, but the patient might decide that the risks of surgery
outweigh the value to him of continuing his own athletic pursuits. A
reconstructive plastic surgeon may, on the basis of her personal aesthetic values,
believe that nasal reconstructive surgery on a woman with an already small nose
would not be aesthetically pleasing, but most people would agree that, while the
surgeon might discuss with the patient the patient's reasons for requesting the
surgery (as well as the risks of surgery), the surgeon's aesthetic opinions should
not be determinative. A heart surgeon might recommend against bypass surgery
in a homosexual patient dying from AIDS because surgery would be too risky
and unlikely to extend the patient's life, but not because she thought that the
patient "deserved to die" as a result of his assumptively promiscuous behavior.
No one would suggest that the physician's personal values should prevail over
the patient's wishes in these medical decisions, all of which will affect the
patient's, and not the physician's, life.
Similarly, a physician's personal attitudes about medical procedures should
not influence his advice to patients who do not share his beliefs. A Jewish
physician should not advise non-Jewish parents to circumcise their newborn son
unless his advice is based on prevailing medical standards. A nurse who is a
Jehovah's Witness should not advise a hemophiliac not to accept blood
transfusions. Physicians, like all other humans, carry their own personal biases
and prejudices that affect who their friends are, what clubs they join, and so on.
No one expects physicians to carry these prejudices into their medical practices.
Yet many refusal clauses allow physicians to refuse to provide certain
controversial medical procedures for any reason, including personal prejudice.
Even those that require some moral or religious justification rarely provide
explicit exceptions when the result of the exercise of such moral or religious
beliefs is denial of care to an identifiable group or class of people. The physician
who refused to provide artificial insemination to a lesbian may be just one
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example of this type of situation.41 6 Another example would be a nurse who
refuses to participate in the care of a homosexual with AIDS because her religion
instructs her that AIDS is the homosexual's just punishment for immoral
behavior.
While Miller and Brody distinguish personal integrity from professional
integrity, they argue that a physician should not have to sacrifice her personal
integrity in the exercise of her professional integrity. They argue, for example,
that a physician who is conscientiously opposed to performing abortions should
not be obligated to compromise her personal integrity or her conscience by
performing abortions, even if performing abortions would not violate her
professional integrity.417 Similarly, Pellegrino views physicians as forming
''consciences in two inseparable dimensions of their lives-the professional and
the personal" where "[b]oth professional and personal conscience are owed
protection."4 1 8 In defending the rights of religious physicians to exercise their
religious objections to participating in certain medical treatments, Pellegrino goes
so far as to state that a secular society's demands for "value neutrality" "is a
psychological schism that violates the integrity of the person as a unity of body,
soul, and psyche, 4 19 and that "value neutrality" elevates "secularism to the level
of a social orthodoxy. '420 He argues that "[p]ersonal and professional ethics are
not fully separable from each other"42 1 and that the autonomy of the physician
demands that she be allowed to express her beliefs through her actions.422 As far
as Catholic physicians are concerned, Pellegrino writes that "to ... ignore,
416. N. Coast Women's Care Med. Group, Inc. v. Superior Court, No. D045438, 2006 WL
618767 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2006) (ordering the superior court to vacate its summary judgment
for the plaintiff in a case involving a physician's refusal to inseminate a patient involved in a
lesbian relationship, finding that there is an issue of fact as to whether the refusal was based on the
patient's status as a lesbian or as an unmarried person). In either case, the physician allegedly based
her refusal on her personal prejudices, as opposed to medical or professional ethical considerations.
417. Miller & Brody, supra note 413, at 10.
418. Pellegrino, supra note 321, at 229; see also Pellegrino, supra note 40, at 51-53.
419. Pellegrino, supra note 321, at 240. The "human potential" movement at the end of the
twentieth century promoted the concept that an individual should seek "wholeness" in his life and
work. This movement was reflected in discussions within the legal profession along two axes.
Those at one pole believed that "the lawyer needs a role-specific ethic which puts the client first,
even in relation to the lawyer as a fully connected, rooted person .... Stephen L. Pepper,
Autonomy, Community, and Lawyers' Ethics, 19 CAP. U. L. REv. 939, 960 (1990). The other pole
consisted of those who were critical of professional norms that "bleach out" one's religion. See,
e.g., Howard Lesnick, The Religious Lawyer in a Pluralist Society, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1469,
1486 (1997-1998).
420. Pellegrino, supra note 321, at 240.
421. Pellegrino, supra note 40, at 51.
422. Pellegrino, supra note 389.
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repress, or act against conscience for any reason is a violation of philosophical as
well as theological ethics, an error in moral agency and a sin against God.,
423
If separating the personal from the professional creates a psychically
damaging schism in the individual, this would mean that the physician who
personally believes that experiencing pain without complaint will hasten a
person's journey to heaven is justified in applying this strongly held belief in his
medical practice by withholding pain medication. Or that a physician who
believes that abortions are so antithetical to her personal beliefs that she is
unwilling to participate in the procedure even to save the life of the pregnant
woman nonetheless is fulfilling her professional responsibilities. These are
untenable positions.42 4
Mark Wicclair takes a more thoughtful approach. He argues for a more
limited basis upon which physicians would be justified in conscientiously
objecting to participating in certain types of medical treatment.425 He asserts that
"an appeal to conscience has significant moral weight only if the core ethical
values on which it is based correspond to one or more core values in
,0426medicine. A physician's personal beliefs, which arise from her moral
framework or religious orientation, have less weight. Wicclair uses the following
examples to illustrate his point.427 One physician, Dr. K, disagrees with her
patient's decision to reject aggressive therapy for his life-threatening condition.
Her patient, who is suffering from terminal cancer, prefers to become a hospice
patient to experience as little pain and loss of dignity as possible. However, Dr. K
believes that she would be betraying her calling as a physician if she lets the
patient die without further efforts to stop the disease's progress. Another
physician, Dr. L, is opposed to providing pain medication because he believes
that pain is a sign of a moral flaw and is therefore deserved. Because of this
belief, when his patient requests pain medication, Dr. L responds that he cannot,
in good conscience, prescribe any. Wicclair suggests that Dr. K's conscientious
objection has more moral weight than Dr. L's moral objections because Dr. K's
objections "can be defended by citing certain values within medicine, such as life
and health, 428 even though it fails to consider other important goals such as the
423. Pellegrino, supra note 321, at 227-28.
424. Nevertheless, Pellegrino argues that even emergency situations "cannot excuse physicians
from fidelity to their personal or moral beliefs. Genuine efforts by patients or families to find a
physician whose beliefs are congruent with the patient's must continue; meanwhile, the attending
physician must continue to care for the patient in accord with the physician's deepest held beliefs."
Pellegrino, supra note 389, at 80.
425. Mark R. Wicclair, Conscientious Objection in Medicine, 14 BIOETHICs 205 (2000).
426. Id. at 217.
427. Id. at 215-21.
428. Id. at 216.
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amelioration of suffering, patient autonomy, and dignity. In contrast, Dr. L's
opposition to pain medication "is based on beliefs and values which are foreign
to medicine., 429 This approach is consistent with the approach of this Article in
positing that health care professionals should be encouraged to apply principles
of professional ethics in treating their patients; however, they should be
discouraged from injecting their personal moral or religious beliefs into their
practice.
Describing medical professionalism "as an activity that involves both the
distribution of a commodity and the fair allocation of a social good but that is
uniquely defined according to moral relationships, 430 Wynia and colleagues
propose a normative guide of medical professionalism that focuses on the
cultivation by physicians of a "devotion to health care values by placing the goals
of individual and public health ahead of other goals," 43' and by placing the health
interests of others ahead of their own personal interests to avoid "even the
appearance that they are primarily devoted to their own interests rather than to
the interests of others., 432 This medical professionalism, for example, requires
physicians to provide health care during an epidemic when they risk their own
health,433 a value that was sorely tested during the AIDS epidemic of recent
decades.434 However, according to Wynia and colleagues, it is not enough to hold
these values; physicians must also speak out about these values, demonstrating
"the shared standards of the profession, which may sometimes conflict with
personal beliefs., 435 Although these authors were most concerned about the role
of medical professionalism within the context of market competition and
financial self-interest, their emphasis on returning to core medical values applies
equally in the context of physicians who put their own personal moral judgments
above their patient's interests. Just as the rise in physicians' incomes in the past
forty years has, according to Wynia and colleagues, "fostered the trust-destroying
belief, whether true or not, that physicians as a group are greedy and take
429. Id. at 217.
430. Matthew K. Wynia et al., Medical Professionalism in Society, 341 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1612,
1612 (1999).
431. Id. at 1613.
432. Id. While the authors focus on financial self-interest, the same point applies to physicians
who place their personal morality ahead of their obligations to patients.
433. Snyder & Leffler, supra note 29, at 565.
434. See Glanz v. Vemick, 750 F. Supp. 39 (D.C. Mass. 1990) (involving an estate that filed a
legal suit against a hospital and surgeon alleging that the surgeon had refused to perform surgery on
the decedent because of his HIV status); Lindsey Gruson, AIDS Fear Spawns Ethics Debate as
Some Doctors Withhold Care, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1987, at Al.
435. Wynia et al., supra note 430, at 1614.
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advantage of patients, 4 36 so the assertion by health care professionals that their
personal moral judgments trump patients' health interests is likely to undermine
patient trust.
Health care professionals' fiduciary duty to their patients has been well
established in various contexts. Legal actions against physicians for breaching
their fiduciary duty to patients have increased in recent years as patients have
suspected that their physicians' treatment decisions were motivated by financial
incentives provided by managed care organizations, rather than by the patients'
health interests.4 37 The American Medical Association emphasized physicians'
fiduciary duty to their patients when it issued a report on physicians who refer to
facilities in which they have a financial interest, noting that "the profession of
medicine is unique and that physicians are expected to put their patients' interests
first. 438 In the context of medical malpractice litigation, one court described the
physician's fiduciary duty as follows:
The relation of physician and patient has its foundation on the theory that the
former is learned, skilled, and experienced in those subjects about which the
latter ordinarily knows little or nothing, but which are of the most vital
importance and interest to him, since upon them may depend the health, or
even life, of himself or family; therefore the patient must necessarily place
great reliance, faith, and confidence in the professional word, advice, and acts
of the physician.439
That reliance and faith is undermined when a physician or other health care
professional puts her own needs above those of her patient.
The fact that health care professionals control patient access to medical care
is also relevant in determining the degree to which their personal beliefs should
affect their provision of care. Arguing that the physicians in the Wanglie case
should not have had the right to withhold life support over the objections of the
patient's husband, Veatch and Spicer contend that the decision to stop
mechanical ventilation was based on the physicians' personal ethical and
philosophical standards, rather than medical science. In such cases, the
clinicians' beliefs and values should not prevail over the patient's conservator's
wishes, especially since the medical profession is a "licensed professional
436. Id. at 1613.
437. See Breach of Fiduciary Duty-New Legal Approach for Plaintijfs, ONCOLOGY NEWS INT'L,
Dec. 1997, at 28, available at http://clinicalfreedom.org/FIDUCO l.HTM.
438. Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Conflicts of Interest: Physician Ownership of
Medical Facilities, 267 JAMA 2366, 2366 (1992).
439. Witherell v. Weimer, 421 N.E.2d 869, 876 (Ill. 1981) (citation omitted).
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monopoly. '440 This idea received additional attention in R. Alto Charo's recent
article in the New England Journal of Medicine, in which she criticized the
growing invocation of refusal statutes by health care professionals to excuse
them from participating in abortions, prescribing contraception, and performing
other controversial medical treatments.441 She suggests that it would be easier to
permit health care professionals to refuse to participate in certain procedures,
based on their consciences
if states did not give these professionals the exclusive right to offer such
services. By granting a monopoly, they turn the profession into a kind of public
utility, obligated to provide service to all who seek it. Claiming an unfettered
right to personal autonomy while holding monopolistic control over a public
good constitutes an abuse of the public trust-all the worse if it is not in fact a
personal act of conscience but, rather, an attempt at cultural conquest.
442
In other words, in view of physicians' exclusive ability to provide the requested
resource, it would be unjust to allow physicians' personal beliefs to prevail over
the patient's autonomous decision.
VI. PRESUMPTION AGAINST THE RIGHT TO REFUSE
The widely accepted ethical principle that patients are autonomous
individuals with the right to make the final decisions concerning their medical
care, along with the corresponding principle that appears in all medical
professionals' codes of ethics that the "patient's interest comes first" leads to the
following general rule: patient care decisions should be based on patient
autonomy, as mediated by the clinician's conclusion that the requested therapy
(1) is not medically contraindicated (since it is both medically effective and not
considered unethical within the profession's generally accepted concept of
ethical practice) and (2) is not illegal. A similar position is taken by Allan Brett
and Laurence McCullough in discussing patients who request specific medical
interventions.443 They suggest the following rule:
When a patient seeks to exercise a positive right to an intervention, a necessary
condition is that there is either an established or a theoretical medical basis for
the patient's request. If that necessary condition has been satisfied, the patient's
unique circumstances and stated reasons for wanting the intervention should
440. Veatch & Spicer, supra note 293, at 36; see also id. at 26-28.
441. R. Alta Charo, The Celestial Fire of Conscience-Refusing To Deliver Medical Care, 352
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2471 (2005).
442. Id. at 2473.
443. Brett & McCullough, supra note 305.
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444guide the final decision-making process.
A health care professional's personal religious or moral beliefs should not enter
into the decision-making process. Under this model, health care professionals
would be discouraged from invoking their personal moral, religious, or political
beliefs to justify their refusal to participate in abortions, prescribe contraception,
or withdraw life support at the request of the patient.
Where there is ongoing disagreement within the medical ethics community
about a particular form of treatment, physicians would not be obligated to
provide it. For example, health care professionals would not be obligated to
participate in physician-assisted suicide, notwithstanding the patient's request,
since the requested action is not generally accepted from a medical ethics
standpoint445 and, moreover, is currently illegal in all states except Oregon.446 If
the status of this activity changes from both the viewpoint of prevailing medical
ethics and the law, the obligations of health care professionals would similarly
change.
This does not mean that a health care professional could not object to
participating in certain types of treatment on the basis of her personal
conscience; that is, based on her personal religious, moral, or political beliefs.
However, personal conscientious objections should be discouraged. Professional
schools and organizations should actively promote the concept that the patient's
best interests must prevail over the health care professional's personal beliefs.
There should be a presumption against the validity of conscientious objection
based on personal, as opposed to professional, values by health care
444. Id. at 1349.
445. In Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), the Court found against several
terminally ill patients and their physicians when they challenged as unconstitutional a Washington
statute prohibiting assisted suicide. In holding that the statute did not violate the patients'
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests, the Court relied on statements of the American Medical
Association and other medical groups that "[p]hysician-assisted suicide is fundamentally
incompatible with the physician's role as healer." Id. at 731. Balancing this interest in the integrity
of the medical profession, along with several other important state interests, against the patient's
liberty interest in physician-assisted suicide, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute. Id.
at 735. This is one of the few cases in which a physician's professional integrity, along with other
state interests, was found to outweigh patients' liberty interests in making autonomous decisions
concerning their health. Cf Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006), in which the Court, on
other grounds, effectively upheld Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-
897 (2003), by enjoining enforcement of the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-
971 (2000), against physicians acting pursuant to the Oregon law. Oregon's statute permits
physicians to prescribe lethal doses of medications to patients that the patients may self-administer.
446. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 911.
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professionals, whose first obligation should be to promote patient health, not
their own interests, and who, through their state-granted licenses, control patient
access to medical care.
CONCLUSION
This Article has reviewed current legislation and judicial opinions
concerning the right of health care professionals to refuse to participate in health
care treatments to which they object on the basis of their personal moral or
religious beliefs. Ultimately, this Article proposes a new model for such
"conscientious objections," one that presumes the general obligation of health
care professionals, who hold monopolistic state licenses, to participate in
requested medical care that is not contraindicated or illegal, notwithstanding their
personal moral objections. This model is based on the premise that it is the
patient's best interest (as determined by the patient, but mediated by the health
care professional's medical judgment), not the health care professional's personal
interests, that should govern the professional relationship. This should be the
standard taught in professional schools and promoted by professional
associations. "Conscientious objections" should be permissible based on
prevailing medical ethics; however, to the extent that they are based on the
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